PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species Forum

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Barack Obama 2.0

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PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by Barack Obama 2.0 » Thu Oct 13, 2016 6:44 pm

I know why C is right, but still can't put my finger on why D is wrong.

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TheBook

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by TheBook » Thu Oct 13, 2016 7:01 pm

In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.

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kindofcanuck

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by kindofcanuck » Thu Oct 13, 2016 7:19 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:I know why C is right, but still can't put my finger on why D is wrong.
Because if the reasoning in the argument is true, then that single fact that is incompatible with the theory is enough to make the first theory false. So it isn't vulnerable to criticism on those grounds because if everything said is true, then the argument is valid.

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34iplaw

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by 34iplaw » Thu Oct 13, 2016 8:35 pm

TheBook wrote:In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.
Reminds me of the metal desk question.

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by Barack Obama 2.0 » Fri Oct 14, 2016 12:08 pm

TheBook wrote:In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.

I understand, but why does it not correctly describe the flaw? We're told according to the typological theory, sister species that cannot interbreed be considered to be part of the same species contrary to the mainstream theory. The author then goes on to conclude that typological theory is unacceptable.

It seems like the author is saying: The idea that some species can look the same and not be part of the same species (because they cannot interbreed) is not compatible with the typological theory, therefore is not acceptable.

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kindofcanuck

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by kindofcanuck » Fri Oct 14, 2016 12:59 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
TheBook wrote:In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.

I understand, but why does it not correctly describe the flaw? We're told according to the typological theory, sister species that cannot interbreed be considered to be part of the same species contrary to the mainstream theory. The author then goes on to conclude that typological theory is unacceptable.

It seems like the author is saying: The idea that some species can look the same and not be part of the same species (because they cannot interbreed) is not compatible with the typological theory, therefore is not acceptable.
The question is that the argument is most vulnerable to which.

The argument is not vulnerable to D, because if true, that single fact incompatible with the theory is enough to destroy the theory.

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by Barack Obama 2.0 » Fri Oct 14, 2016 1:07 pm

kindofcanuck wrote:
Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
TheBook wrote:In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.

I understand, but why does it not correctly describe the flaw? We're told according to the typological theory, sister species that cannot interbreed be considered to be part of the same species contrary to the mainstream theory. The author then goes on to conclude that typological theory is unacceptable.

It seems like the author is saying: The idea that some species can look the same and not be part of the same species (because they cannot interbreed) is not compatible with the typological theory, therefore is not acceptable.
The question is that the argument is most vulnerable to which.

The argument is not vulnerable to D, because if true, that single fact incompatible with the theory is enough to destroy the theory.

Sorry I don't quite understand, can you elaborate? Are you saying that in order for a flaw question to be right, the correct answer if true must destroy the argument? Also can someone address where I went wrong with my train of thought in my previous post?

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by kindofcanuck » Fri Oct 14, 2016 1:12 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote: Sorry I don't quite understand, can you elaborate? Are you saying that in order for a flaw question to be right, the correct answer if true must destroy the argument?
It doesn't have to destroy it. The argument has to be most vulnerable to it. In this example, it isn't vulnerable at all to (D).

The stimulus says there's a theory on speciation, which says anything that looks alike is related, whether or not they can interbreed. It also says normal theory on speciation says in order to be the same species, they must be able to interbreed. So the first theory is wrong.

D asks if the stimulus is vulnerable to the notion that a single fact about the theory is being used to prove it wrong. It isn't vulnerable to that at all, because (if true), that single fact that the defining feature of a species is whether or not they can interbreed, destroys the first theory of speciation.

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TheBook

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by TheBook » Fri Oct 14, 2016 1:28 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
TheBook wrote:In my view... Answer D is merely an accurate statement, meaning the statement applies to the premise, but what it is describing is not a flaw, per se. It is an incorrect answer because it does not describe a flaw, not because the answer choice is necessarily inapplicable to the stimulus.

It's like seeing a could be true answer for a must be true question. The answer is wrong for this particular question, but it could still be a legitimate statement that applies to the stimulus.

I understand, but why does it not correctly describe the flaw? We're told according to the typological theory, sister species that cannot interbreed be considered to be part of the same species contrary to the mainstream theory. The author then goes on to conclude that typological theory is unacceptable.

It seems like the author is saying: The idea that some species can look the same and not be part of the same species (because they cannot interbreed) is not compatible with the typological theory, therefore is not acceptable.

Your comment "but why does it not correctly describe the flaw" alludes to me that your still holding the assumption that answer D is attempting to describe a flaw. It is not describing a flaw, it is more or less an accurate statement that ultimately allows the conclusion to be properly drawn.

As canuck outlined, if the statements in the premise are taken as true, Answer D is enough to show that the argument is valid.

If your're still mulling it over, keep asking questions until it really clicks.

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by Barack Obama 2.0 » Fri Oct 14, 2016 1:45 pm

kindofcanuck wrote:
Barack Obama 2.0 wrote: Sorry I don't quite understand, can you elaborate? Are you saying that in order for a flaw question to be right, the correct answer if true must destroy the argument?
It doesn't have to destroy it. The argument has to be most vulnerable to it. In this example, it isn't vulnerable at all to (D).

The stimulus says there's a theory on speciation, which says anything that looks alike is related, whether or not they can interbreed. It also says normal theory on speciation says in order to be the same species, they must be able to interbreed. So the first theory is wrong.

D asks if the stimulus is vulnerable to the notion that a single fact about the theory is being used to prove it wrong. It isn't vulnerable to that at all, because (if true), that single fact that the defining feature of a species is whether or not they can interbreed, destroys the first theory of speciation.

ah okay, gotcha, makes a lot more sense.
D would be correct if the argument went like this:
Premise: According to the typological theory, species that look the same are part of the same species
Premise 2: However it has been conclusively proven that species that cannot interbreed even if they look the same are not part of the same species.
Conclusion: Therefore the typological theory is wrong.

Also for flaw/descriptive weakening questions is it safe to say that the answer if true must at least strengthen the argument ? Like you pointed out, if D is true, it wouldn't strengthen but in fact destroy the argument.

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by kindofcanuck » Fri Oct 14, 2016 1:48 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
kindofcanuck wrote:
Barack Obama 2.0 wrote: Sorry I don't quite understand, can you elaborate? Are you saying that in order for a flaw question to be right, the correct answer if true must destroy the argument?
It doesn't have to destroy it. The argument has to be most vulnerable to it. In this example, it isn't vulnerable at all to (D).

The stimulus says there's a theory on speciation, which says anything that looks alike is related, whether or not they can interbreed. It also says normal theory on speciation says in order to be the same species, they must be able to interbreed. So the first theory is wrong.

D asks if the stimulus is vulnerable to the notion that a single fact about the theory is being used to prove it wrong. It isn't vulnerable to that at all, because (if true), that single fact that the defining feature of a species is whether or not they can interbreed, destroys the first theory of speciation.

ah okay, gotcha, makes a lot more sense.
D would be correct if the argument went like this:
Premise: According to the typological theory, species that look the same are part of the same species
Premise 2: However it has been conclusively proven that species that cannot interbreed even if they look the same are not part of the same species.
Conclusion: Therefore the typological theory is wrong.

Also for flaw/descriptive weakening questions is it safe to say that the answer if true must at least strengthen the argument ? Like you pointed out, if D is true, it wouldn't strengthen but in fact destroy the argument.
I think you swap your argument about half way through there.

The argument is not vulnerable to D. It doesn't destroy the argument (that the first theory is wrong). If true, it is enough for the argument to be valid.

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by Barack Obama 2.0 » Fri Oct 14, 2016 2:04 pm

kindofcanuck wrote:
Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
kindofcanuck wrote:
Barack Obama 2.0 wrote: Sorry I don't quite understand, can you elaborate? Are you saying that in order for a flaw question to be right, the correct answer if true must destroy the argument?
It doesn't have to destroy it. The argument has to be most vulnerable to it. In this example, it isn't vulnerable at all to (D).

The stimulus says there's a theory on speciation, which says anything that looks alike is related, whether or not they can interbreed. It also says normal theory on speciation says in order to be the same species, they must be able to interbreed. So the first theory is wrong.

D asks if the stimulus is vulnerable to the notion that a single fact about the theory is being used to prove it wrong. It isn't vulnerable to that at all, because (if true), that single fact that the defining feature of a species is whether or not they can interbreed, destroys the first theory of speciation.

ah okay, gotcha, makes a lot more sense.
D would be correct if the argument went like this:
Premise: According to the typological theory, species that look the same are part of the same species
Premise 2: However it has been conclusively proven that species that cannot interbreed even if they look the same are not part of the same species.
Conclusion: Therefore the typological theory is wrong.

Also for flaw/descriptive weakening questions is it safe to say that the answer if true must at least strengthen the argument ? Like you pointed out, if D is true, it wouldn't strengthen but in fact destroy the argument.

I think you swap your argument about half way through there.

The argument is not vulnerable to D. It doesn't destroy the argument (that the first theory is wrong). If true, it is enough for the argument to be valid.
Sorry I got it backwards. You're right the argument is not vulnerable to D, this is accentuated by the fact that if D were true it would strengthen the argument. The correct answer would if true would need to at the very least weaken the argument correct?

The argument would be vulnerable to D if it were constructed like this instead no?
Premise 1: According to the typological theory, species that look the same are part of the same species
Premise 2: However it has been conclusively proven that species that cannot interbreed even if they look the same are not part of the same species.
Conclusion: Therefore the typological theory is wrong.

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kindofcanuck

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Re: PT51.S1.Q15 - The typological theory of species

Post by kindofcanuck » Fri Oct 14, 2016 2:10 pm

Barack Obama 2.0 wrote:
Sorry I got it backwards. You're right the argument is not vulnerable to D, this is accentuated by the fact that if D were true it would strengthen the argument. The correct answer would if true would need to at the very least weaken the argument correct?
Yes. The argument needs to be vulnerable to it, so if true, it makes it weaker. It doesn't have to destroy it, it just has to be (if true) a successful attack, which makes the argument any less likely.

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