Adaptibar user hangout - July 2017 Forum

[bda]

I have seen a few threads about individual student's completion percentage of their programs and thought I would ask how far people are with Adaptibar - I find it interesting that as of about 1 minute ago the "overall average" has students at 671 questions completed (which is about 38% of the program).

I have completed 1,118 questions thus far, my main focus this last week is review of essay topics so I am going through outlines for non-MBE subjects and over the weekend will review my short, attack-sheet outlines (roughly 70 pages for the 14 topics) so Ill likely only get another 100-200 done. I think I am pretty well set for where I stand now, but I am amazed at how low the national average is with questions completed.

So where are you now? Have a goal for these last few days? Any impressions regarding the program now that the end is near?

I have 950 done on Adaptibar. Also doing Barbri, but in theory "behind" on Barbri because I stopped doing their problem sets after 3-4 in each subject. I also never anticipated doing all Adaptibar questions though, given that I'm doing it in conjunction with Barbri.

[barkschool]

working Q's every other day, falling in the 70-80% range

Trying to find the right balance to just maintain until next Wednesday

[ndbigdave]

I have seen a few threads about individual student's completion percentage of their programs and thought I would ask how far people are with Adaptibar - I find it interesting that as of about 1 minute ago the "overall average" has students at 671 questions completed (which is about 38% of the program).

I have completed 1,118 questions thus far, my main focus this last week is review of essay topics so I am going through outlines for non-MBE subjects and over the weekend will review my short, attack-sheet outlines (roughly 70 pages for the 14 topics) so Ill likely only get another 100-200 done. I think I am pretty well set for where I stand now, but I am amazed at how low the national average is with questions completed.

So where are you now? Have a goal for these last few days? Any impressions regarding the program now that the end is near?

I have 950 done on Adaptibar. Also doing Barbri, but in theory "behind" on Barbri because I stopped doing their problem sets after 3-4 in each subject. I also never anticipated doing all Adaptibar questions though, given that I'm doing it in conjunction with Barbri.

That makes sense, I keep forgetting many (most?) people have their traditional program to do questions with as well (which is a great idea to mix for sake of seeing material presented in different ways, and, frankly, because you paid for it). I was just surprised the accumulative number was so low (not even 40%) with 1 week until the bar, naturally that number will go up...but thought it noteworthy never the less.

[ndbigdave]

working Q's every other day, falling in the 70-80% range

Trying to find the right balance to just maintain until next Wednesday

That is my goal too. I have spent such little time with the essay topics that I know they should be my focus, but I dont want to lose my edge with the MBE either. My goal is have a "good" MBE score which allows some latitude for the essays, which was actually my goal for my first bar in Michigan yet somehow my essay score was a point higher than my MBE (go figure). I just feel like i can control the MBE far better than the randomness of the essays (I cant predict the SUBJECT of what will be tested let alone the subtopics) so I bank on my strong writing ability, good memory and then BS-ing and "thinking like a lawyer" to cross the finish line.

[barkschool]

working Q's every other day, falling in the 70-80% range

Trying to find the right balance to just maintain until next Wednesday

That is my goal too. I have spent such little time with the essay topics that I know they should be my focus, but I dont want to lose my edge with the MBE either. My goal is have a "good" MBE score which allows some latitude for the essays, which was actually my goal for my first bar in Michigan yet somehow my essay score was a point higher than my MBE (go figure). I just feel like i can control the MBE far better than the randomness of the essays (I cant predict the SUBJECT of what will be tested let alone the subtopics) so I bank on my strong writing ability, good memory and then BS-ing and "thinking like a lawyer" to cross the finish line.

part of me is hoping we all get a little bump on the real MBE from (1) a reduced amount of questions in our weak areas, (not every question can be about third party rights in contracts) and (2) a slight break from the difficult civ pro questions

[ndbigdave]

working Q's every other day, falling in the 70-80% range

Trying to find the right balance to just maintain until next Wednesday

That is my goal too. I have spent such little time with the essay topics that I know they should be my focus, but I dont want to lose my edge with the MBE either. My goal is have a "good" MBE score which allows some latitude for the essays, which was actually my goal for my first bar in Michigan yet somehow my essay score was a point higher than my MBE (go figure). I just feel like i can control the MBE far better than the randomness of the essays (I cant predict the SUBJECT of what will be tested let alone the subtopics) so I bank on my strong writing ability, good memory and then BS-ing and "thinking like a lawyer" to cross the finish line.

part of me is hoping we all get a little bump on the real MBE from (1) a reduced amount of questions in our weak areas, (not every question can be about third party rights in contracts) and (2) a slight break from the difficult civ pro questions

Definitely agree, my only real outlier are the Civ-Pro questions (a subject I did really well in for law school and feel comfortable with so my struggles with the questions is baffling) so when I run the math and bring Civ-Pro more in-line with my other scores I feel really good about where I stand, also more low-hanging fruit to get on the real test that is more evenly distributed as outlined by the NCBE on their website.

[PourMeTea]

is adaptibar working for everyone rn

[barkschool]

is adaptibar working for everyone rn

every once and a while hard to sign in, eventually works

[PourMeTea]

is adaptibar working for everyone rn

every once and a while hard to sign in, eventually works

looks like it's down

[PourMeTea]

at least they fix their technical issues way quicker than barbri

[sk1130]

For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied the land.

Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction.

Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.

The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her.

Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.

The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

[+] Spoiler

A. The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
B. The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
C. The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
D. The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm to her son.


Can someone explain to me why the answer is C and not D? This might be a stupid question but the answer explanation says, "Having established title to the farm by adverse possession, there is no requirement that the woman sue to establish title. Therefore, she could convey the farm to her son." That said, when does the rule saying an adverse possessor must quiet title kick in?

[ndbigdave]

For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied the land.

Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction.

Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.

The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her.

Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.

The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

[+] Spoiler

A. The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
B. The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
C. The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
D. The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm to her son.


Can someone explain to me why the answer is C and not D? This might be a stupid question but the answer explanation says, "Having established title to the farm by adverse possession, there is no requirement that the woman sue to establish title. Therefore, she could convey the farm to her son." That said, when does the rule saying an adverse possessor must quiet title kick in?

Trying to explain in layman's terms so it makes sense:

Man owned the farm, but through adverse possession the woman then had title.

The info regarding the other person who put up signs and took possession of the land is irrelevant as it was only for 3 years and that person had no right to keep her off the land.

The oral agreement is irrelevant as we are dealing with land (statute of frauds) - so the woman retained her title to the land.

Woman then conveyed a title to her son.

The son now has title.

Thus C is the correct answer.

[sk1130]

For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied the land.

Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction.

Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.

The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her.

Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.

The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

[+] Spoiler

A. The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
B. The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
C. The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
D. The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm to her son.


Can someone explain to me why the answer is C and not D? This might be a stupid question but the answer explanation says, "Having established title to the farm by adverse possession, there is no requirement that the woman sue to establish title. Therefore, she could convey the farm to her son." That said, when does the rule saying an adverse possessor must quiet title kick in?

Trying to explain in layman's terms so it makes sense:

Man owned the farm, but through adverse possession the woman then had title.

The info regarding the other person who put up signs and took possession of the land is irrelevant as it was only for 3 years and that person had no right to keep her off the land.

The oral agreement is irrelevant as we are dealing with land (statute of frauds) - so the woman retained her title to the land.

Woman then conveyed a title to her son.

The son now has title.

Thus C is the correct answer.

Yeah, I understand what happened in the question. I was more so referring to the statement answer choice D made, as I recognize that there is some connection between requiring to quiet title and taking by adverse possession. So I was asking for clarification on where that idea comes form/where it applies, or if I'm just completely mistaken. (thanks though!)

[t-14orbust]

Yeah, I understand what happened in the question. I was more so referring to the statement answer choice D made, as I recognize that there is some connection between requiring to quiet title and taking by adverse possession. So I was asking for clarification on where that idea comes form/where it applies, or if I'm just completely mistaken. (thanks though!)

I think it just has to do with conveying marketable title. Title acquired through adverse possession isn't marketable, so you need to quiet title to make it that way.

[ndbigdave]

For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied the land.

Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction.

Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.

The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her.

Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.

The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

[+] Spoiler

A. The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
B. The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
C. The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
D. The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm to her son.


Can someone explain to me why the answer is C and not D? This might be a stupid question but the answer explanation says, "Having established title to the farm by adverse possession, there is no requirement that the woman sue to establish title. Therefore, she could convey the farm to her son." That said, when does the rule saying an adverse possessor must quiet title kick in?

Trying to explain in layman's terms so it makes sense:

Man owned the farm, but through adverse possession the woman then had title.

The info regarding the other person who put up signs and took possession of the land is irrelevant as it was only for 3 years and that person had no right to keep her off the land.

The oral agreement is irrelevant as we are dealing with land (statute of frauds) - so the woman retained her title to the land.

Woman then conveyed a title to her son.

The son now has title.

Thus C is the correct answer.

Yeah, I understand what happened in the question. I was more so referring to the statement answer choice D made, as I recognize that there is some connection between requiring to quiet title and taking by adverse possession. So I was asking for clarification on where that idea comes form/where it applies, or if I'm just completely mistaken. (thanks though!)

Sorry for misunderstanding your question.

I hope this explanation is better:

Simply put, there is no requirement for a quiet title action in order for the woman to pass title to her son. I suppose in the real world to clear up loose ends and clean up the title history for the future it would make sense to file a claim to quiet title, establish that adverse possession has taken place and THEN pass title to the son, but it is not REQUIRED. To obtain TITLE by adverse possession one must simply:

Continuous--A single adverse possessor must maintain continuous possession of the property. However, the continuity may be maintained between successive adverse possessors if there is privity between them.

Hostile--In this context, "hostile" does not mean "unfriendly." Rather, it means that the possession infringes on the rights of the true owner. If the true owner consents or gives license to the adverse possessor's use of the property, possession is not hostile and it is not really adverse possession. Renters cannot be adverse possessors of the rented property, regardless of how long they possess it.

Open and Notorious--Possession must be obvious to anyone who bothers to look, so as to put the true owner on notice that a trespasser is in possession. One will not succeed with an adverse possession claim if it is secret.

Actual--The adverse possessor is actually in possession of someone else's property. The true owner has a cause of action for trespass, which must be pursued within the statute of limitations.

Exclusive--The adverse possessor does not share control of the property with any one else (unless in privity with himself). He excludes others from possession, as if he was actual owner.

There are no other required steps to obtain title to land by adverse possession. So the Quiet Title Action is an unnecessary step.

[sk1130]

Yeah, I understand what happened in the question. I was more so referring to the statement answer choice D made, as I recognize that there is some connection between requiring to quiet title and taking by adverse possession. So I was asking for clarification on where that idea comes form/where it applies, or if I'm just completely mistaken. (thanks though!)

I think it just has to do with conveying marketable title. Title acquired through adverse possession isn't marketable, so you need to quiet title to make it that way.

I think that's what I was thinking of, thank you!

[sk1130]

For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied the land.

Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction.

Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew.

The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her.

Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed.

The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.

Who now owns the farm?

[+] Spoiler

A. The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
B. The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
C. The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
D. The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm to her son.


Can someone explain to me why the answer is C and not D? This might be a stupid question but the answer explanation says, "Having established title to the farm by adverse possession, there is no requirement that the woman sue to establish title. Therefore, she could convey the farm to her son." That said, when does the rule saying an adverse possessor must quiet title kick in?

Trying to explain in layman's terms so it makes sense:

Man owned the farm, but through adverse possession the woman then had title.

The info regarding the other person who put up signs and took possession of the land is irrelevant as it was only for 3 years and that person had no right to keep her off the land.

The oral agreement is irrelevant as we are dealing with land (statute of frauds) - so the woman retained her title to the land.

Woman then conveyed a title to her son.

The son now has title.

Thus C is the correct answer.

Yeah, I understand what happened in the question. I was more so referring to the statement answer choice D made, as I recognize that there is some connection between requiring to quiet title and taking by adverse possession. So I was asking for clarification on where that idea comes form/where it applies, or if I'm just completely mistaken. (thanks though!)

Sorry for misunderstanding your question.

I hope this explanation is better:

Simply put, there is no requirement for a quiet title action in order for the woman to pass title to her son. I suppose in the real world to clear up loose ends and clean up the title history for the future it would make sense to file a claim to quiet title, establish that adverse possession has taken place and THEN pass title to the son, but it is not REQUIRED. To obtain TITLE by adverse possession one must simply:

Continuous--A single adverse possessor must maintain continuous possession of the property. However, the continuity may be maintained between successive adverse possessors if there is privity between them.

Hostile--In this context, "hostile" does not mean "unfriendly." Rather, it means that the possession infringes on the rights of the true owner. If the true owner consents or gives license to the adverse possessor's use of the property, possession is not hostile and it is not really adverse possession. Renters cannot be adverse possessors of the rented property, regardless of how long they possess it.

Open and Notorious--Possession must be obvious to anyone who bothers to look, so as to put the true owner on notice that a trespasser is in possession. One will not succeed with an adverse possession claim if it is secret.

Actual--The adverse possessor is actually in possession of someone else's property. The true owner has a cause of action for trespass, which must be pursued within the statute of limitations.

Exclusive--The adverse possessor does not share control of the property with any one else (unless in privity with himself). He excludes others from possession, as if he was actual owner.

There are no other required steps to obtain title to land by adverse possession. So the Quiet Title Action is an unnecessary step.

That makes much more sense, thank you so much!!

[SchneefaLongoria]

Not sure if this one has been discussed yet, but can anyone talk me through the distinction between B and D? I thought that you couldn't enforce a contract as an intended third-party beneficiary until your property rights vested (ex. from being made aware of the contract and doing something in reliance). I thought B was wrong because simply being an intended third-party beneficiary does not give you a right to enforce the contract.

Thanks in advance.

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

In exchange for valid and sufficient consideration, a mother orally promised her son, who had no car and wanted a minivan, "to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof." Two months later, the son bought a used minivan on credit from a car dealership for $8,000. At the time, the dealership was unaware of the mother's earlier promise to her son, but learned of it shortly after the sale.

Can the dealership enforce the mother's promise to her son?

A. Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

B. Yes, because the dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother-son contract.

C. No, because the mother's promise to her son is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds.

D. No, because the dealership was neither identified when the mother's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivan sale was made.

EXPLANATION:

Answer B is correct. A third party acquires standing to enforce a promise only if that party is an intended beneficiary of the promise. A party is an intended beneficiary of a promise if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intent of the parties, such as where the promisor knows that the promisee intended to confer a benefit on the beneficiary. The dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother's promise to her son because both parties understood that the purpose of the contract between them was to confer a benefit on the future seller of the son's minivan. This purpose is clear from the terms of the mother's promise, which was to pay the purchase price "to anyone from whom you buy a minivan."

A is incorrect because the dealership was not aware of the mother's promise at the time that it sold the minivan to the son, and therefore could not have relied on it. C is incorrect because the suretyship provision of the Statute of Frauds does not apply where the surety promise was made to the principal (the son) and not to the obligee (the dealership). D is incorrect because, although the dealership's identification and awareness of the mother's promise is relevant to determining when its rights as beneficiary vest, it is not relevant to determining whether it is an intended or incidental beneficiary.

[barkschool]

Not sure if this one has been discussed yet, but can anyone talk me through the distinction between B and D? I thought that you couldn't enforce a contract as an intended third-party beneficiary until your property rights vested (ex. from being made aware of the contract and doing something in reliance). I thought B was wrong because simply being an intended third-party beneficiary does not give you a right to enforce the contract.

Thanks in advance.

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

In exchange for valid and sufficient consideration, a mother orally promised her son, who had no car and wanted a minivan, "to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof." Two months later, the son bought a used minivan on credit from a car dealership for $8,000. At the time, the dealership was unaware of the mother's earlier promise to her son, but learned of it shortly after the sale.

Can the dealership enforce the mother's promise to her son?

A. Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

B. Yes, because the dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother-son contract.

C. No, because the mother's promise to her son is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds.

D. No, because the dealership was neither identified when the mother's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivan sale was made.

EXPLANATION:

Answer B is correct. A third party acquires standing to enforce a promise only if that party is an intended beneficiary of the promise. A party is an intended beneficiary of a promise if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intent of the parties, such as where the promisor knows that the promisee intended to confer a benefit on the beneficiary. The dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother's promise to her son because both parties understood that the purpose of the contract between them was to confer a benefit on the future seller of the son's minivan. This purpose is clear from the terms of the mother's promise, which was to pay the purchase price "to anyone from whom you buy a minivan."

A is incorrect because the dealership was not aware of the mother's promise at the time that it sold the minivan to the son, and therefore could not have relied on it. C is incorrect because the suretyship provision of the Statute of Frauds does not apply where the surety promise was made to the principal (the son) and not to the obligee (the dealership). D is incorrect because, although the dealership's identification and awareness of the mother's promise is relevant to determining when its rights as beneficiary vest, it is not relevant to determining whether it is an intended or incidental beneficiary.

D mistates the rule, and what is needed here.

Any dealer can become the intended third party beneficiary by performing on the contract. Because the contract intends to benefit any dealer lending credit to the son.

Then, the dealers rights under the contract vest as soon as they seek to enforce it against the mother (or if they act in reliance, or notified the mother---- the other two vesting possibilities)

[SchneefaLongoria]

Not sure if this one has been discussed yet, but can anyone talk me through the distinction between B and D? I thought that you couldn't enforce a contract as an intended third-party beneficiary until your property rights vested (ex. from being made aware of the contract and doing something in reliance). I thought B was wrong because simply being an intended third-party beneficiary does not give you a right to enforce the contract.

Thanks in advance.

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

In exchange for valid and sufficient consideration, a mother orally promised her son, who had no car and wanted a minivan, "to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof." Two months later, the son bought a used minivan on credit from a car dealership for $8,000. At the time, the dealership was unaware of the mother's earlier promise to her son, but learned of it shortly after the sale.

Can the dealership enforce the mother's promise to her son?

A. Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

B. Yes, because the dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother-son contract.

C. No, because the mother's promise to her son is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds.

D. No, because the dealership was neither identified when the mother's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivan sale was made.

EXPLANATION:

Answer B is correct. A third party acquires standing to enforce a promise only if that party is an intended beneficiary of the promise. A party is an intended beneficiary of a promise if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intent of the parties, such as where the promisor knows that the promisee intended to confer a benefit on the beneficiary. The dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother's promise to her son because both parties understood that the purpose of the contract between them was to confer a benefit on the future seller of the son's minivan. This purpose is clear from the terms of the mother's promise, which was to pay the purchase price "to anyone from whom you buy a minivan."

A is incorrect because the dealership was not aware of the mother's promise at the time that it sold the minivan to the son, and therefore could not have relied on it. C is incorrect because the suretyship provision of the Statute of Frauds does not apply where the surety promise was made to the principal (the son) and not to the obligee (the dealership). D is incorrect because, although the dealership's identification and awareness of the mother's promise is relevant to determining when its rights as beneficiary vest, it is not relevant to determining whether it is an intended or incidental beneficiary.

D mistates the rule, and what is needed here.

Any dealer can become the intended third party beneficiary by performing on the contract. Because the contract intends to benefit any dealer lending credit to the son.

Then, the dealers rights under the contract vest as soon as they seek to enforce it against the mother (or if they act in reliance, or notified the mother---- the other two vesting possibilities)

Perfect. Thanks!

[ConfusedL1]

Not sure if this one has been discussed yet, but can anyone talk me through the distinction between B and D? I thought that you couldn't enforce a contract as an intended third-party beneficiary until your property rights vested (ex. from being made aware of the contract and doing something in reliance). I thought B was wrong because simply being an intended third-party beneficiary does not give you a right to enforce the contract.

Thanks in advance.

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

In exchange for valid and sufficient consideration, a mother orally promised her son, who had no car and wanted a minivan, "to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof." Two months later, the son bought a used minivan on credit from a car dealership for $8,000. At the time, the dealership was unaware of the mother's earlier promise to her son, but learned of it shortly after the sale.

Can the dealership enforce the mother's promise to her son?

A. Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

B. Yes, because the dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother-son contract.

C. No, because the mother's promise to her son is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds.

D. No, because the dealership was neither identified when the mother's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivan sale was made.

EXPLANATION:

Answer B is correct. A third party acquires standing to enforce a promise only if that party is an intended beneficiary of the promise. A party is an intended beneficiary of a promise if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intent of the parties, such as where the promisor knows that the promisee intended to confer a benefit on the beneficiary. The dealership is an intended beneficiary of the mother's promise to her son because both parties understood that the purpose of the contract between them was to confer a benefit on the future seller of the son's minivan. This purpose is clear from the terms of the mother's promise, which was to pay the purchase price "to anyone from whom you buy a minivan."

A is incorrect because the dealership was not aware of the mother's promise at the time that it sold the minivan to the son, and therefore could not have relied on it. C is incorrect because the suretyship provision of the Statute of Frauds does not apply where the surety promise was made to the principal (the son) and not to the obligee (the dealership). D is incorrect because, although the dealership's identification and awareness of the mother's promise is relevant to determining when its rights as beneficiary vest, it is not relevant to determining whether it is an intended or incidental beneficiary.

D mistates the rule, and what is needed here.

Any dealer can become the intended third party beneficiary by performing on the contract. Because the contract intends to benefit any dealer lending credit to the son.

Then, the dealers rights under the contract vest as soon as they seek to enforce it against the mother (or if they act in reliance, or notified the mother---- the other two vesting possibilities)

Perfect. Thanks!

Damn. Woe to all the applicants who did not read thoroughly and picked C. Nicely done, MBE.

[bda]

I feel like I'm missing something obvious here... For land contracts, I thought time wasn't of the essence unless specified. How does that not apply to this?

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

A landowner contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to a farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to the farmer on the same date. On January 15, landowner notified the farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, the landowner would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured the farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000.

On January 30, the farmer accepted a conveyance and possession of Greenacre and paid the $500,000 purchase price, but notified the landowner that he was reserving any rights he might have to damages caused by the landowner's breach. The farmer intended to use the land for raising cattle and had entered into a contract for the purchase of 500 head of cattle to be delivered to Greenacre on January 15. Because he did not have possession of Greenacre on that date, he had to rent another pasture at a cost of $2,000 to graze the cattle for 15 days. The landowner had no reason to know that the farmer intended to use Greenacre for raising cattle or that he was purchasing cattle to be grazed on Greenacre.

In an action by the farmer against the landowner for damages, the farmer is entitled to recover
A. nothing, because by paying the purchase price on January 30, he waived whatever cause of action he may have had.
B. nominal damages only, because the market value of the land exceeded the contract price.
C. $2,500 only (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days).
D. $2,500 (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days), plus $2,000 (the cost of grazing the cattle elsewhere for 15 days).

EXPLANATION:

Answer C is correct. Where a partial breach of contract occurs, the non-breaching party remains obligated to perform the contract but may recover damages for the partial breach. Consequential damages for breach of contract are limited to those that the breaching party had reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach at the time that the contract was made. When the landowner delivered possession of Greenacre 15 days after the time specified in the contract, he committed a partial breach, entitling the farmer to damages for the loss to him resulting from the delay. Because the landowner had no reason to know of the farmer's intended use of the land, the landowner is not obligated to pay damages for the cost of renting another pasture. The landowner is, however, obligated to pay the fair rental value of Greenacre for the 15-day period of delay.

Choice A is incorrect because the farmer reserved his rights to claim damages for partial breach. Choice B is incorrect because the market value of Greenacre relative to the contract price is not relevant to determining damages for delay in delivery of possession. Choice D is incorrect because the $2,000 cost of renting another pasture was not reasonably foreseeable to the landowner and therefore not recoverable as consequential damages.

[ndbigdave]

I feel like I'm missing something obvious here... For land contracts, I thought time wasn't of the essence unless specified. How does that not apply to this?

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

A landowner contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to a farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to the farmer on the same date. On January 15, landowner notified the farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, the landowner would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured the farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000.

On January 30, the farmer accepted a conveyance and possession of Greenacre and paid the $500,000 purchase price, but notified the landowner that he was reserving any rights he might have to damages caused by the landowner's breach. The farmer intended to use the land for raising cattle and had entered into a contract for the purchase of 500 head of cattle to be delivered to Greenacre on January 15. Because he did not have possession of Greenacre on that date, he had to rent another pasture at a cost of $2,000 to graze the cattle for 15 days. The landowner had no reason to know that the farmer intended to use Greenacre for raising cattle or that he was purchasing cattle to be grazed on Greenacre.

In an action by the farmer against the landowner for damages, the farmer is entitled to recover
A. nothing, because by paying the purchase price on January 30, he waived whatever cause of action he may have had.
B. nominal damages only, because the market value of the land exceeded the contract price.
C. $2,500 only (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days).
D. $2,500 (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days), plus $2,000 (the cost of grazing the cattle elsewhere for 15 days).

EXPLANATION:

Answer C is correct. Where a partial breach of contract occurs, the non-breaching party remains obligated to perform the contract but may recover damages for the partial breach. Consequential damages for breach of contract are limited to those that the breaching party had reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach at the time that the contract was made. When the landowner delivered possession of Greenacre 15 days after the time specified in the contract, he committed a partial breach, entitling the farmer to damages for the loss to him resulting from the delay. Because the landowner had no reason to know of the farmer's intended use of the land, the landowner is not obligated to pay damages for the cost of renting another pasture. The landowner is, however, obligated to pay the fair rental value of Greenacre for the 15-day period of delay.

Choice A is incorrect because the farmer reserved his rights to claim damages for partial breach. Choice B is incorrect because the market value of Greenacre relative to the contract price is not relevant to determining damages for delay in delivery of possession. Choice D is incorrect because the $2,000 cost of renting another pasture was not reasonably foreseeable to the landowner and therefore not recoverable as consequential damages.

You are correct that, unless specifically stated there is no "time is of the essence" for land contracts. However, I think this is a question where finely reading the answer choices brings you to the correct answer.

A - is wrong because simply paying on January 30th does NOT waive any claims he may have, in fact he explicitly stated he was not waving claims.
B - is wrong because of the type of damages being sought (the farmer eventually got the land and paid the contract price)
D - is wrong because the fact pattern explicitly states that the seller had no reason to know/foresee the use of the land by the farmer

which leaves only C, even if the answer doesnt feel "quite right" or perfectly in line.

In some respects the court treats it as if the contract DID go through on the 15th but the farmer could not take until the 30th due to a tenant being on the land - as the farmer was the owner as of the 15th half of the rent should go to him.

[malleus discentium]

I feel like I'm missing something obvious here... For land contracts, I thought time wasn't of the essence unless specified. How does that not apply to this?

[+] Spoiler

QUESTION:

A landowner contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to a farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to the farmer on the same date. On January 15, landowner notified the farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, the landowner would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured the farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000.

On January 30, the farmer accepted a conveyance and possession of Greenacre and paid the $500,000 purchase price, but notified the landowner that he was reserving any rights he might have to damages caused by the landowner's breach. The farmer intended to use the land for raising cattle and had entered into a contract for the purchase of 500 head of cattle to be delivered to Greenacre on January 15. Because he did not have possession of Greenacre on that date, he had to rent another pasture at a cost of $2,000 to graze the cattle for 15 days. The landowner had no reason to know that the farmer intended to use Greenacre for raising cattle or that he was purchasing cattle to be grazed on Greenacre.

In an action by the farmer against the landowner for damages, the farmer is entitled to recover
A. nothing, because by paying the purchase price on January 30, he waived whatever cause of action he may have had.
B. nominal damages only, because the market value of the land exceeded the contract price.
C. $2,500 only (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days).
D. $2,500 (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days), plus $2,000 (the cost of grazing the cattle elsewhere for 15 days).

EXPLANATION:

Answer C is correct. Where a partial breach of contract occurs, the non-breaching party remains obligated to perform the contract but may recover damages for the partial breach. Consequential damages for breach of contract are limited to those that the breaching party had reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach at the time that the contract was made. When the landowner delivered possession of Greenacre 15 days after the time specified in the contract, he committed a partial breach, entitling the farmer to damages for the loss to him resulting from the delay. Because the landowner had no reason to know of the farmer's intended use of the land, the landowner is not obligated to pay damages for the cost of renting another pasture. The landowner is, however, obligated to pay the fair rental value of Greenacre for the 15-day period of delay.

Choice A is incorrect because the farmer reserved his rights to claim damages for partial breach. Choice B is incorrect because the market value of Greenacre relative to the contract price is not relevant to determining damages for delay in delivery of possession. Choice D is incorrect because the $2,000 cost of renting another pasture was not reasonably foreseeable to the landowner and therefore not recoverable as consequential damages.

You're confusing material and immaterial breaches. Unless time is of the essence, short delays in performance of a land contract is a minor breach--it doesn't relieve the other party from performance but it does give rise to damages. If time is of the essence or the delay is substantial, then it's a material breach that relieves the other party from performance and gives rise to damages.

[barkschool]

Is public land dedication still tested on the MBE?

Question:

[+] Spoiler

In 2000, the owner of a 100-acre tract prepared and duly recorded a subdivision plan called Happy Acres. The plan showed 90 one-acre lots and a ten-acre tract in the center that was designated "Future Public School." The owner published and distributed a brochure promoting Happy Acres which emphasized the proximity of the lots to the school property and indicated potential tax savings "because the school district will not have to expend tax money to acquire this property." There is no specific statute concerning the dedication of school sites.

The owner sold 50 of the lots to individual purchasers. Each deed referred to the recorded plan and also contained the following clause: "No mobile home shall be erected on any lot within Happy Acres." A woman was one of the original purchasers from the owner.

In 2006, the owner sold the remaining 40 lots and the ten-acre tract to a man by a deed which referred to the plan and contained the restriction relating to mobile homes. The man sold the 40 lots to individual purchasers and the ten-acre tract to a friend. None of the deeds from the man referred to the plan or contained any reference to mobile homes.

In 2007, the school board of the district in which Happy Acres is situated has voted to erect a new school on the ten-acre tract. In an appropriate action between the school board and the friend to determine title, the result will be in favor of

A. the friend, because the school board has been guilty of laches.

B. the friend, because his deed did not refer to the subdivision plan.

C. the school board, because the friend had constructive notice of the proposed use of the tract.

D. the school board, because there has been a dedication and acceptance of the tract.

Answer:

[+] Spoiler

D. The issue being tested here is the dedication of land for public use which requires two elements: (1) dedication, and (2) acceptance. Under common law, an offer of dedication may be made by: (1) a written or oral statement, (2) the submission of a map or plat showing the dedication, or (3) the opening of the land to public use. Acceptance can occur by: (1) a formal resolution, (2) the approval of the map or plat, or (3) the actual assumption of maintenance or construction of improvements.

Here the dedication took place when the owner recorded the plan of the subdivision, marking the land to be set aside for the future school. Once land has been dedicated, it can be accepted at anytime unless the dedication is revoked by the original grantor. Additionally, the public cannot lose dedicated lands by non-use or delay in use of the lands for the purpose for which they were dedicated. The conveyance from the owner to the man did not revoke the dedication because the man was aware of the reservation. Therefore, the school board was still able to accept the dedication when it voted in 2007. The conveyance from the man to the friend also did not revoke the dedication. However, the friend will likely be able to recover from the man the value of the property lost plus the cost of removing any improvements made to the land because the man was responsible for the friend's ignorance of the reservation of the land for public use.