Themis Bar Review Hangout - July 2016 Forum

[Hmasterflex]

Texas doesn't use the mee and has a gripload of additional topics. On several of them, the Themis materials had all the crucial points of law but failed to connect the dots (like forgetting an application paragraph in a jury instruction). Took an estates and administration practice essay and was certain I was going to fail -- felt like I had no clue wtf was going on. Got everything right -- straight intestacy questions. On one hand -- i feel more confident in my ability to bs -- on the other hand, i feel completely unprepared.

I hate the bar

'

I too am taking the Texas bar - the sheer volume of state specific subjects is crap. There weren't even half this many when I took the arizona bar in 2009 but i know a lot of stuff has changed.

What did you think about the directed study? some subjects came up for "review" several times, while others like family law appeared once the day after the lecture.

[Vantwins]

MBE PQs keeps trying to distract me with random latin terms I've never heard before - "malum in se misdemeanor"??

[BigZuck]

I'm struggling with "but for" in negligence. Here are 2 examples that I don't understand how the original tortfeasor could be responsible:

[+] Spoiler

A city ordinance makes it unlawful to park a motor vehicle on a city street within ten feet of a fire hydrant. At 1:55 p.m. a man, realizing he must be in the bank before it closed at 2:00 p.m., and finding no other space available, parked his automobile in front of a fire hydrant on a city street. The man then hurried into the bank, leaving his aged neighbor as a passenger in the rear seat of the car. About 5 minutes later, and while the man was still in the bank, a driver was driving down the street. The driver swerved to avoid what he mistakenly thought was a hole in the street and sideswiped the man's car. The man's car was turned over on top of the hydrant, breaking the hydrant and causing a small flood of water. The man's car was severely damaged and the neighbor was badly injured. There is no applicable guest statute.

If the city asserts a claim against the driver for the damage to the fire hydrant and the driver was negligent in swerving his car, his negligence is
A: a cause in fact and a legal cause of the city's harm.
B: a cause in fact, but not a legal cause, of the city's harm because the man parked illegally.
C: a legal cause, but not a cause in fact, of the city's harm because the man's car struck the hydrant.
D: neither a legal cause nor a cause in fact of the city's harm.

The explanation for the answer is: A is the correct answer. Negligence requires duty, breach, causation, and damages. The driver had a duty to drive with ordinary care, and breached that duty by sideswiping a parked car and damaging the fire hydrant. Therefore, the issue here is causation. The driver was the cause-in-fact of the damage because but for the driver's sideswiping of the man's car, the car would not have overturned onto the hydrant and caused damage. Likewise, the driver is the proximate cause of the damage because the resulting damages were a foreseeable result of the driver's negligence. The unforeseeable manner in which the damage occurred does not relieve the driver of liability. Thus, the driver's negligence is the actual and proximate cause of the city's harm. Therefore, B, C, and D are incorrect.

I understand that but for the driver sideswiping man's car, the city's hydrant would not have been damaged, but wouldn't that also be the case if the man hadn't have parked there in the first place?

[+] Spoiler

While driving at a speed in excess of the statutory limit, the defendant negligently collided with another car, and the disabled vehicles blocked two of the highway's three northbound lanes. When the plaintiff approached the scene two minutes later, he slowed his car to see if he could help those involved in the collision. As he slowed, he was rear- ended by the driver of another vehicle. The plaintiff, who sustained damage to his car and was seriously injured, brought an action against the defendant to recover damages. The jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common law rules pertaining to contributory negligence.

If the defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, should the motion be granted?
A: Yes, because it was the driver, not the defendant, who collided with the plaintiff's car and caused the plaintiff's injuries.
B: Yes, because the plaintiff could have safely passed the disabled vehicles in the traffic lane that remained open.
C: No, because a jury could find that the plaintiff's injury arose from a risk that was a continuing consequence of the defendant's negligence.
D: No, because the defendant was driving in excess of the statutory limit when he negligently caused the first accident.

The explanation for the answer is: C is the correct answer. This question addresses the issue of causation in a negligence action, and causation requires that the defendant's negligence be both the actual and legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant is the actual cause of the plaintiff's injuries because but for the defendant's negligent speeding, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Furthermore, it is possible the defendant is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries because it is foreseeable that speeding would cause an accident, and that the accident would create a dangerous road condition leading to subsequent accidents.
A is incorrect because it is possible that the driver was a foreseeable independent intervening force, and his collision with the plaintiff's car was a foreseeable result of the accident caused by the defendant. B is incorrect because even if the plaintiff was negligent in not taking the open lane, his contributory negligence would only go to damages, it would not automatically sever the defendant's liability. D is incorrect because although it is the right outcome, it is based on the wrong reasoning. Even if the defendant was speeding when he caused the first accident, the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant was the actual and proximate cause of the second accident, between the plaintiff and the driver.

How is it foreseeable to a speeder involved in a car accident that a lookie-loo would be rear-ended by another driver?

Really, my plan for the MBE is to say the person is liable but I want to understand why.

The NCBE/Themis or whoever it is has a really dumb conception of proximate cause wherein basically everything is foreseeable (although look out for things like intervening criminal acts and stuff like that). It's really, really, really dumb. They also like to make dumb dumb Cardozo arguments which confuse duty with proximate cause. Like, hello dumb dumbs, maybe don't follow Cardozo because Palsgraf is an abomination?

So yeah, if you just go into it assuming everything is foreseeable you'll be like 97% of the way there. These questions aren't even close to the worst offenders of their dumb dumbery. Don't even try to understand their "logic," because A. It doesn't exist and B. You'll be a worse LEARNED STUDENT OF TORTS AND FEASORS OF TORTS because of it.

Themis gonna Them, bar exam gonna bar exam, just go with it and be happy you'll be free of all this garbage in a little over a week.

[hirkaismyname]

I'm struggling with "but for" in negligence. Here are 2 examples that I don't understand how the original tortfeasor could be responsible:

[+] Spoiler

A city ordinance makes it unlawful to park a motor vehicle on a city street within ten feet of a fire hydrant. At 1:55 p.m. a man, realizing he must be in the bank before it closed at 2:00 p.m., and finding no other space available, parked his automobile in front of a fire hydrant on a city street. The man then hurried into the bank, leaving his aged neighbor as a passenger in the rear seat of the car. About 5 minutes later, and while the man was still in the bank, a driver was driving down the street. The driver swerved to avoid what he mistakenly thought was a hole in the street and sideswiped the man's car. The man's car was turned over on top of the hydrant, breaking the hydrant and causing a small flood of water. The man's car was severely damaged and the neighbor was badly injured. There is no applicable guest statute.

If the city asserts a claim against the driver for the damage to the fire hydrant and the driver was negligent in swerving his car, his negligence is
A: a cause in fact and a legal cause of the city's harm.
B: a cause in fact, but not a legal cause, of the city's harm because the man parked illegally.
C: a legal cause, but not a cause in fact, of the city's harm because the man's car struck the hydrant.
D: neither a legal cause nor a cause in fact of the city's harm.

The explanation for the answer is: A is the correct answer. Negligence requires duty, breach, causation, and damages. The driver had a duty to drive with ordinary care, and breached that duty by sideswiping a parked car and damaging the fire hydrant. Therefore, the issue here is causation. The driver was the cause-in-fact of the damage because but for the driver's sideswiping of the man's car, the car would not have overturned onto the hydrant and caused damage. Likewise, the driver is the proximate cause of the damage because the resulting damages were a foreseeable result of the driver's negligence. The unforeseeable manner in which the damage occurred does not relieve the driver of liability. Thus, the driver's negligence is the actual and proximate cause of the city's harm. Therefore, B, C, and D are incorrect.

I understand that but for the driver sideswiping man's car, the city's hydrant would not have been damaged, but wouldn't that also be the case if the man hadn't have parked there in the first place?

[+] Spoiler

While driving at a speed in excess of the statutory limit, the defendant negligently collided with another car, and the disabled vehicles blocked two of the highway's three northbound lanes. When the plaintiff approached the scene two minutes later, he slowed his car to see if he could help those involved in the collision. As he slowed, he was rear- ended by the driver of another vehicle. The plaintiff, who sustained damage to his car and was seriously injured, brought an action against the defendant to recover damages. The jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common law rules pertaining to contributory negligence.

If the defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, should the motion be granted?
A: Yes, because it was the driver, not the defendant, who collided with the plaintiff's car and caused the plaintiff's injuries.
B: Yes, because the plaintiff could have safely passed the disabled vehicles in the traffic lane that remained open.
C: No, because a jury could find that the plaintiff's injury arose from a risk that was a continuing consequence of the defendant's negligence.
D: No, because the defendant was driving in excess of the statutory limit when he negligently caused the first accident.

The explanation for the answer is: C is the correct answer. This question addresses the issue of causation in a negligence action, and causation requires that the defendant's negligence be both the actual and legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant is the actual cause of the plaintiff's injuries because but for the defendant's negligent speeding, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Furthermore, it is possible the defendant is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries because it is foreseeable that speeding would cause an accident, and that the accident would create a dangerous road condition leading to subsequent accidents.
A is incorrect because it is possible that the driver was a foreseeable independent intervening force, and his collision with the plaintiff's car was a foreseeable result of the accident caused by the defendant. B is incorrect because even if the plaintiff was negligent in not taking the open lane, his contributory negligence would only go to damages, it would not automatically sever the defendant's liability. D is incorrect because although it is the right outcome, it is based on the wrong reasoning. Even if the defendant was speeding when he caused the first accident, the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant was the actual and proximate cause of the second accident, between the plaintiff and the driver.

How is it foreseeable to a speeder involved in a car accident that a lookie-loo would be rear-ended by another driver?

Really, my plan for the MBE is to say the person is liable but I want to understand why.

The second question relates to danger invites rescue. If your negligent action is the initial cause, and it may invite rescue, then you are also responsible for the rescuer's injury, and his negligence/injury caused during the rescue. Absent the rescuer acts in a "Bizzare" manner.

The injury must be foreseeable...terms like "normal consequence" or "continuing consequence" in the call/ans choices should alert you we have: 1. a causation issue, and 2. potential intervening superseding cause. The key is to look for whether the injury resulted was "within the risk initially created by the D's negligence".

[rambleon65]

I'm struggling with "but for" in negligence. Here are 2 examples that I don't understand how the original tortfeasor could be responsible:

[+] Spoiler

A city ordinance makes it unlawful to park a motor vehicle on a city street within ten feet of a fire hydrant. At 1:55 p.m. a man, realizing he must be in the bank before it closed at 2:00 p.m., and finding no other space available, parked his automobile in front of a fire hydrant on a city street. The man then hurried into the bank, leaving his aged neighbor as a passenger in the rear seat of the car. About 5 minutes later, and while the man was still in the bank, a driver was driving down the street. The driver swerved to avoid what he mistakenly thought was a hole in the street and sideswiped the man's car. The man's car was turned over on top of the hydrant, breaking the hydrant and causing a small flood of water. The man's car was severely damaged and the neighbor was badly injured. There is no applicable guest statute.

If the city asserts a claim against the driver for the damage to the fire hydrant and the driver was negligent in swerving his car, his negligence is
A: a cause in fact and a legal cause of the city's harm.
B: a cause in fact, but not a legal cause, of the city's harm because the man parked illegally.
C: a legal cause, but not a cause in fact, of the city's harm because the man's car struck the hydrant.
D: neither a legal cause nor a cause in fact of the city's harm.

The explanation for the answer is: A is the correct answer. Negligence requires duty, breach, causation, and damages. The driver had a duty to drive with ordinary care, and breached that duty by sideswiping a parked car and damaging the fire hydrant. Therefore, the issue here is causation. The driver was the cause-in-fact of the damage because but for the driver's sideswiping of the man's car, the car would not have overturned onto the hydrant and caused damage. Likewise, the driver is the proximate cause of the damage because the resulting damages were a foreseeable result of the driver's negligence. The unforeseeable manner in which the damage occurred does not relieve the driver of liability. Thus, the driver's negligence is the actual and proximate cause of the city's harm. Therefore, B, C, and D are incorrect.

I understand that but for the driver sideswiping man's car, the city's hydrant would not have been damaged, but wouldn't that also be the case if the man hadn't have parked there in the first place?

[+] Spoiler

While driving at a speed in excess of the statutory limit, the defendant negligently collided with another car, and the disabled vehicles blocked two of the highway's three northbound lanes. When the plaintiff approached the scene two minutes later, he slowed his car to see if he could help those involved in the collision. As he slowed, he was rear- ended by the driver of another vehicle. The plaintiff, who sustained damage to his car and was seriously injured, brought an action against the defendant to recover damages. The jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common law rules pertaining to contributory negligence.

If the defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, should the motion be granted?
A: Yes, because it was the driver, not the defendant, who collided with the plaintiff's car and caused the plaintiff's injuries.
B: Yes, because the plaintiff could have safely passed the disabled vehicles in the traffic lane that remained open.
C: No, because a jury could find that the plaintiff's injury arose from a risk that was a continuing consequence of the defendant's negligence.
D: No, because the defendant was driving in excess of the statutory limit when he negligently caused the first accident.

The explanation for the answer is: C is the correct answer. This question addresses the issue of causation in a negligence action, and causation requires that the defendant's negligence be both the actual and legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant is the actual cause of the plaintiff's injuries because but for the defendant's negligent speeding, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Furthermore, it is possible the defendant is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries because it is foreseeable that speeding would cause an accident, and that the accident would create a dangerous road condition leading to subsequent accidents.
A is incorrect because it is possible that the driver was a foreseeable independent intervening force, and his collision with the plaintiff's car was a foreseeable result of the accident caused by the defendant. B is incorrect because even if the plaintiff was negligent in not taking the open lane, his contributory negligence would only go to damages, it would not automatically sever the defendant's liability. D is incorrect because although it is the right outcome, it is based on the wrong reasoning. Even if the defendant was speeding when he caused the first accident, the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant was the actual and proximate cause of the second accident, between the plaintiff and the driver.

How is it foreseeable to a speeder involved in a car accident that a lookie-loo would be rear-ended by another driver?

Really, my plan for the MBE is to say the person is liable but I want to understand why.

The second question relates to danger invites rescue. If your negligent action is the initial cause, and it may invite rescue, then you are also responsible for the rescuer's injury, and his negligence/injury caused during the rescue. Absent the rescuer acts in a "Bizzare" manner.

The injury must be foreseeable...terms like "normal consequence" or "continuing consequence" in the call/ans choices should alert you we have: 1. a causation issue, and 2. potential intervening superseding cause. The key is to look for whether the injury resulted was "within the risk initially created by the D's negligence".

But don't forget to note the firefighter rule!

[pheerful22]

Texas doesn't use the mee and has a gripload of additional topics. On several of them, the Themis materials had all the crucial points of law but failed to connect the dots (like forgetting an application paragraph in a jury instruction). Took an estates and administration practice essay and was certain I was going to fail -- felt like I had no clue wtf was going on. Got everything right -- straight intestacy questions. On one hand -- i feel more confident in my ability to bs -- on the other hand, i feel completely unprepared.

I hate the bar

'

I too am taking the Texas bar - the sheer volume of state specific subjects is crap. There weren't even half this many when I took the arizona bar in 2009 but i know a lot of stuff has changed.

What did you think about the directed study? some subjects came up for "review" several times, while others like family law appeared once the day after the lecture.

i wrote this lengthy reply to your question and didnt see it posted. basically i followed the directed study as best i could when i was still listening to the substantive lectures. I only follow it closely when doing the graded essays and the simulated exams. I am sort of all over the place with the review and do flex study a lot because there are a few subjects i wanted to cement into my memory that weren't up on the calendar for a while. Plus its hard to follow the directed study to a T because i have a baby who demands a lot of attention.

[ndp1234]

Ok Themis. Apparently from that 100 Q set, rogue domiciliaries exist where natural persons don't have a domicile

[barprep1980]

Looking for advice on when in the coming week I should do my full simulated MBE.

As background, I'm 55% done with the course, with a heavy focus on MBE prep. Done 1200 MBE questions so far, and plan to do 100 per day until the 26th. Pretty confident I'd do fine on the MBE subject essays, but have done very minimal prep on the pure MEE subjects.

I've done the mixed sets through #8. Last three mixed set scores are 64%, 72%, and 64%.

Thoughts?

[rambleon65]

Looking for advice on when in the coming week I should do my full simulated MBE.

As background, I'm 55% done with the course, with a heavy focus on MBE prep. Done 1200 MBE questions so far, and plan to do 100 per day until the 26th. Pretty confident I'd do fine on the MBE subject essays, but have done very minimal prep on the pure MEE subjects.

I've done the mixed sets through #8. Last three mixed set scores are 64%, 72%, and 64%.

Thoughts?

If you've done 1200 MBE qs already, i'd take the simulated one ASAP so that you can focus on the MBE subjects you're struggling most with. Learn the MEE subjects (pretty basically) and shoot for 75% of the course (which is very much doable).

[minimumcontacts]

MBE PQs keeps trying to distract me with random latin terms I've never heard before - "malum in se misdemeanor"??

The only reason I know this is from Legally Blonde.

[Vantwins]

MBE PQs keeps trying to distract me with random latin terms I've never heard before - "malum in se misdemeanor"??

The only reason I know this is from Legally Blonde.

really?? I'm going to have to watch that again! (in august)

[iworkforlsac]

Anyone care to clarify factual/legal impossibility & mistake of law/fact as defenses in criminal law? TIA

[Robb]

Anyone care to clarify factual/legal impossibility & mistake of law/fact as defenses in criminal law? TIA

My understanding is:

Mistake of law is a defense if
(i) one relied on a high level government interpretation of the law (e.g., an appellate court or the attorney general says something is not a violation of the law)
(ii) lack of notice (i.e., the statute is not made reasonably available) or
(iii) the mistake goes to an element of a specific intent crime

Mistake of fact is a defense for
(i) a specific intent crime if the mistake is honest;
(ii) a general intent crime if the mistake is honest and reasonable; and
(iii) a strict liability crime under no circumstance.

Legal impossibility is a defense to conspiracy or attempt if the supposed crime agreed to/attempted is not actually a crime. (Note: if it would have been a crime were the facts as the defendant believed them to be, it is not a defense to attempt. E.g., I put sugar in my oatmeal, under the impression that sugar is an illicit substance, but I am not guilty of using an illicit substance; by contrast, I try to kill someone who is already dead, and I am still guilty of attempted murder, but not murder.) Factual impossibility is never a defense.

[mu13ski]

Anyone care to clarify factual/legal impossibility & mistake of law/fact as defenses in criminal law? TIA

My understanding is:

Mistake of law is a defense if
(i) one relied on a high level government interpretation of the law (e.g., an appellate court or the attorney general says something is not a violation of the law)
(ii) lack of notice (i.e., the statute is not made reasonably available) or
(iii) the mistake goes to an element of a specific intent crime

Mistake of fact is a defense for
(i) a specific intent crime if the mistake is honest;
(ii) a general intent crime if the mistake is honest and reasonable; and
(iii) a specific intent crime under no circumstance.

Legal impossibility is a defense to conspiracy or attempt if the supposed crime agreed to/attempted is not actually a crime. (Note: if it would have been a crime were the facts as the defendant believed them to be, it is not a defense to attempt. E.g., I put sugar in my oatmeal, under the impression that sugar is an illicit substance, but I am not guilty of using an illicit substance; by contrast, I try to kill someone who is already dead, and I am still guilty of attempted murder, but not murder.) Factual impossibility is never a defense.

I think you mean "a strict liability crime under no circumstance" right?

[ChocolateTruffle]

For anyone with the Strategies & Tactics book... I found the questions in the Property section to be insanely difficult and I got a ton wrong Is it just me? Is that what the questions on the bar are going to be like? Themis property questions were easier... now I'm really freaking out.

[unidentifiable]

For anyone with the Strategies & Tactics book... I found the questions in the Property section to be insanely difficult and I got a ton wrong Is it just me? Is that what the questions on the bar are going to be like? Themis property questions were easier... now I'm really freaking out.

no. those questions are definitely harder. They're worded really weird, and focus on land sale BS.

I really hope the bar questions wont be like that.

[Sheeit]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

[ChocolateTruffle]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

[Sheeit]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

I have been doing essays and other things through flex study according to the recommended study schedule, but there's no way to complete the review tasks through it. I did the reviews, I just want to get them off my screen.

[unidentifiable]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

I have been doing essays and other things through flex study according to the recommended study schedule, but there's no way to complete the review tasks through it. I did the reviews, I just want to get them off my screen.

Yeah. I hate this. I wanted to save my last Contracts essay for later this week, but I was so bummed that I couldn't get the Agency, Partnerships, and Corps Reviews off of my tasks that I just did the essay.

Some BS.

[Vantwins]

just missed what should have been an easy question -

2 merchants contracting under UCC do not have to sign the K, but if it's an irrevocable firm offer, it must be signed by the offeror.

is that right??

[ChocolateTruffle]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

I have been doing essays and other things through flex study according to the recommended study schedule, but there's no way to complete the review tasks through it. I did the reviews, I just want to get them off my screen.

Yeah. I hate this. I wanted to save my last Contracts essay for later this week, but I was so bummed that I couldn't get the Agency, Partnerships, and Corps Reviews off of my tasks that I just did the essay.

Some BS.

Yeah, that is really annoying. I hate that too.

[Vantwins]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

I have been doing essays and other things through flex study according to the recommended study schedule, but there's no way to complete the review tasks through it. I did the reviews, I just want to get them off my screen.

Yeah. I hate this. I wanted to save my last Contracts essay for later this week, but I was so bummed that I couldn't get the Agency, Partnerships, and Corps Reviews off of my tasks that I just did the essay.

Some BS.

Yeah, that is really annoying. I hate that too.

Agreed, once you go into flex study, it should let you drag and move the tasks in the order you like so you can still work through a checklist.

[unidentifiable]

Apparently "optional practice set" isn't so optional. I can't complete any of my review tasks because I have to do two optional PQ sets first. There's no way to skip over them. Great feature.

Skip over them by going into flex mode and picking what you want to do

I have been doing essays and other things through flex study according to the recommended study schedule, but there's no way to complete the review tasks through it. I did the reviews, I just want to get them off my screen.

Yeah. I hate this. I wanted to save my last Contracts essay for later this week, but I was so bummed that I couldn't get the Agency, Partnerships, and Corps Reviews off of my tasks that I just did the essay.

Some BS.

Yeah, that is really annoying. I hate that too.

Agreed, once you go into flex study, it should let you drag and move the tasks in the order you like so you can still work through a checklist.

Yeah, or a postpone/"i'll do it tomorrow" option. Although I could see that getting out of hand.

I think we've collectively offered numerous, constructive ways that Themis could change the way it does things. I hope their employees read this forum. lol

[hirkaismyname]

just missed what should have been an easy question -

2 merchants contracting under UCC do not have to sign the K, but if it's an irrevocable firm offer, it must be signed by the offeror.

is that right??

R: offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed record that by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time (30 days), but can't exceed 3mo; must be signed by the offeror.

-if the firm offer time lapses, it may still remain open unless the offer is revoked/terminated by the offeror; or offeree does something that indicates its rejection of the offer.