Bar Prep Questions: Black Letter Law Thread Forum

[BVest]

My study materials say that a corporate defendant is deemed to reside (for purposes of venue) in each district with which it has sufficient contacts to justify personal jurisdiction with respect to the action.

Is this entirely different from corporate citizenship (state of inc. + state of principal place of business)?

ETA: I think I understand it now. Clarifying the basic shit like this is helping me for memorizing rule statements in advance of the MEE stuff.

I knew this rule but now it got me thinking, does it apply to partnerships?

Good question. I'm guessing that it depends who is named. If the partners are named individually, then no; however, if the partnership is named then yes.

Just a guess, though.

for smj a partnership is a citizen of each state in which the partners (limited or general) are domiciled. But I'm wondering if for venue this changes also to anywhere where there is PJ with respect to the action.

That's what I'm talking about. Obviously the rule that BVest outlined is correct for purposes of determining citizenship for the inquiry of SMJ. As far as PJ goes, I'm guessing that a partnership can be hailed into court anywhere that it has engaged in regular, systematic, continuous business.

You may have PJ in jurisdictions where the partners are as well. I don't really know much about this... I do know that courts generally don't permit for transient PJ (i.e. partner or agent is in Hawaii on vacation and gets served there does not confer PJ over partnership, just as it would not over a corporation).

[ballouttacontrol]

Property Set 5, Question #10.

Landowner devises campground in her will "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

The second clause does not violate RAP because it's limited to Niece's lifetime. But WHY doesn't the determinable clause get stricken?? I thought it would become this because of the RAP violation:

"to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

But the answer says that the neices will have a fee simple determinable. WTF WHY?????

I think it's because the remainderman on the first clause is the grantor. The GSA's interest terminates on the expiration of "her lifetime," but the "so long as" remains. If the grantor wanted to terminate the condition completely, it would have been written more like "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, but if used for any purpose other than camping and recreation during niece's lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

So the grantor can restrict the use of a property for perpetuity, ie for eternity, as long as he retains the possibility of reverter? I could have sworn there was some rule against that????

So, a grant such as this: "to my daughter and her heirs, so long as the property is used for camping," is a fee simple determinable that will revert to grantor's estate even thousands of years in the future? This doesn't seem right/I don't understand.....

[ellewoods123]

Property Set 5, Question #10.

Landowner devises campground in her will "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

The second clause does not violate RAP because it's limited to Niece's lifetime. But WHY doesn't the determinable clause get stricken?? I thought it would become this because of the RAP violation:

"to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

But the answer says that the neices will have a fee simple determinable. WTF WHY?????

I think it's because the remainderman on the first clause is the grantor. The GSA's interest terminates on the expiration of "her lifetime," but the "so long as" remains. If the grantor wanted to terminate the condition completely, it would have been written more like "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, but if used for any purpose other than camping and recreation during niece's lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

So the grantor can restrict the use of a property for perpetuity, ie for eternity, as long as he retains the possibility of reverter? I could have sworn there was some rule against that????

So, a grant such as this: "to my daughter and her heirs, so long as the property is used for camping," is a fee simple determinable that will revert to grantor's estate even thousands of years in the future? This doesn't seem right/I don't understand.....

You wouldn't strike the so long as clause because that clause is valid. It would never violate the rap because the future interest is in the grantor i.e. Rap doesn't violate no reason to strike. Only the second clause violates rap. Thus, only second clause gets struck

The only limitation on the grantor is that he cannot create an absolute ban on alienation. That would be void. A few simple determinable is freely alienable, so no dead hand control issue. Daughter can sell it if she wants so long as used for those purposes

[BVest]

Property Set 5, Question #10.

Landowner devises campground in her will "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

The second clause does not violate RAP because it's limited to Niece's lifetime. But WHY doesn't the determinable clause get stricken?? I thought it would become this because of the RAP violation:

"to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

But the answer says that the neices will have a fee simple determinable. WTF WHY?????

I think it's because the remainderman on the first clause is the grantor. The GSA's interest terminates on the expiration of "her lifetime," but the "so long as" remains. If the grantor wanted to terminate the condition completely, it would have been written more like "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, but if used for any purpose other than camping and recreation during niece's lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

So the grantor can restrict the use of a property for perpetuity, ie for eternity, as long as he retains the possibility of reverter? I could have sworn there was some rule against that????

So, a grant such as this: "to my daughter and her heirs, so long as the property is used for camping," is a fee simple determinable that will revert to grantor's estate even thousands of years in the future? This doesn't seem right/I don't understand.....

These are generally covered by statutes of repose that begin to run at the time of the transfer or death (for testamentary transfers) and run 30 to 50 years, depending on the state.... but at common law, yeah, theoretically forever.

[ballouttacontrol]

Property Set 5, Question #10.

Landowner devises campground in her will "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

The second clause does not violate RAP because it's limited to Niece's lifetime. But WHY doesn't the determinable clause get stricken?? I thought it would become this because of the RAP violation:

"to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, so long as it used for camping and recreational purposes; if used for any other purpose during her lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

But the answer says that the neices will have a fee simple determinable. WTF WHY?????

I think it's because the remainderman on the first clause is the grantor. The GSA's interest terminates on the expiration of "her lifetime," but the "so long as" remains. If the grantor wanted to terminate the condition completely, it would have been written more like "to my niece, her heirs, and assigns, but if used for any purpose other than camping and recreation during niece's lifetime, then to the Girl Scouts of America."

So the grantor can restrict the use of a property for perpetuity, ie for eternity, as long as he retains the possibility of reverter? I could have sworn there was some rule against that????

So, a grant such as this: "to my daughter and her heirs, so long as the property is used for camping," is a fee simple determinable that will revert to grantor's estate even thousands of years in the future? This doesn't seem right/I don't understand.....

These are generally covered by statutes of repose that begin to run at the time of the transfer or death (for testamentary transfers) and run 30 to 50 years, depending on the state.... but at common law, yeah, theoretically forever.

Damn, gotcha.

Thanks everyone, clears it up.

[mvp99]

On assignments, who the hell is the obligor?

[ellewoods123]

On assignments, who the hell is the obligor?

Always the original contracting party who does not assign

[iliketurtles123]

Strict Scrutiny

On themis' MBE, the answer was supposed to be SL.
However, the answer choice stated "necessary to achieve an IMPORTANT interest" (not "compelling").

This is correct? If "necessary" the buzzword? I thought both "necessary" and "compelling" was required, and "compelling" was not the same as "important", since "important" is used in intermediate scrutiny as well

[mvp99]

Strict Scrutiny

On themis' MBE, the answer was supposed to be SL.
However, the answer choice stated "necessary to achieve an IMPORTANT interest" (not "compelling").

This is correct? If "necessary" the buzzword? I thought both "necessary" and "compelling" was required, and "compelling" was not the same as "important", since "important" is used in intermediate scrutiny as well

If this is not EP, check the language elsewhere because for some unknown puzzling reason the Supreme Court uses slightly different language for some other tests instead of sticking with the standard EP language we all know.

[iliketurtles123]

Strict Scrutiny

On themis' MBE, the answer was supposed to be SL.
However, the answer choice stated "necessary to achieve an IMPORTANT interest" (not "compelling").

This is correct? If "necessary" the buzzword? I thought both "necessary" and "compelling" was required, and "compelling" was not the same as "important", since "important" is used in intermediate scrutiny as well

If this is not EP, check the language elsewhere because for some unknown puzzling reason the Supreme Court uses slightly different language for some other tests instead of sticking with the standard EP language we all know.

Yeah it seems like this language (using "important" for strict scructiny) has been repeated by Themis multiple times. I guess the buzzword is "necessary". I think what they're getting at is the interest is "important" enough to be compelling. So "important" isn't a buzzword, rather a general word.

[L_William_W]

Strict Scrutiny

On themis' MBE, the answer was supposed to be SL.
However, the answer choice stated "necessary to achieve an IMPORTANT interest" (not "compelling").

This is correct? If "necessary" the buzzword? I thought both "necessary" and "compelling" was required, and "compelling" was not the same as "important", since "important" is used in intermediate scrutiny as well

I'm pretty sure it's compelling. If it doesn't say compelling then I would be very wary. On all of Barbri's outlines, as well as legal dictionaries, Strict Scrutiny is "necessary to achieve a compelling government interest." Sometimes an answer can turn on the specific wording of a choice.

I'm also suspicious of MBE's created by testing companies. They're not always an accurate representation of what's going to be on the exam.

[ballouttacontrol]

Strict Scrutiny

On themis' MBE, the answer was supposed to be SL.
However, the answer choice stated "necessary to achieve an IMPORTANT interest" (not "compelling").

This is correct? If "necessary" the buzzword? I thought both "necessary" and "compelling" was required, and "compelling" was not the same as "important", since "important" is used in intermediate scrutiny as well

I'm pretty sure it's compelling. If it doesn't say compelling then I would be very wary. On all of Barbri's outlines, as well as legal dictionaries, Strict Scrutiny is "necessary to achieve a compelling government interest." Sometimes an answer can turn on the specific wording of a choice.

I'm also suspicious of MBE's created by testing companies. They're not always an accurate representation of what's going to be on the exam.

For equal protection:
Strict scrutiny = necessary for a compelling interest
Intermediate = substantially related to an important interest
Rational basis review = rationally related to a legitimate interest

There are some other standards in various other areas that mix these up, like I think the contract clause requires necessary for important interest. also Don't forget narrow tailoring.

Look in your CMR, they give u the standard for everything. This is the basis of ConLaw and there's no way anyone could lay out every standard here

[mvp99]

Is it possible to elicit a statement for the first time in cross-examination and then bring in a prior inconsistent statement to impeach? or are prior inconsistent statements always limited to statements that the W said on direct?

[LionelHutzJD]

Is it possible to elicit a statement for the first time in cross-examination and then bring in a prior inconsistent statement to impeach? or are prior inconsistent statements always limited to statements that the W said on direct?

Yes to your first question. No to your second question.

PIS is allowed on cross or on direct through extrinsic evidence. You can also impeach your own witness through the same means.

[mvp99]

Is it possible to elicit a statement for the first time in cross-examination and then bring in a prior inconsistent statement to impeach? or are prior inconsistent statements always limited to statements that the W said on direct?

Yes to your first question. No to your second question.

PIS is allowed on cross or on direct through extrinsic evidence. You can also impeach your own witness through the same means.

Thanks.

[mvp99]

Are the steps in front of a government building a public (like sidewalks) or limited use forum? Adaptibar says its public.

They're a public forum. Think of it this way, could the government limit the use of the steps to certain types of people? If so, it's a limited public forum. As an example, the city could not close its city hall steps to non-residents expressing themselves, but if the city also has conference rooms available in city hall for meetings, it could limit use of the of the conference rooms to residents of the city.

Hey Bvest, check barbri's Con law set 6 question 15, Barbri thinks the steps in front of a government building are non-public/limited public forums. They say VP neutral and rational basis applies.

[apricot]

I have in my civpro notes that the Supreme Court will not accept appeals of matters other than federal questions (act of congress, constitution, treaty) - so what if the case is diversity jurisdiction only? Will that never be able to be appealed to the Supreme Court? Where do I appeal that to?

[ndp1234]

Does someone have examples of a superseding cause that would cut off liability from a tortfeasor except criminal acts?

[getemgoon]

Once a third party defendant is impleaded, may she assert permissive and compulsory claims to both the defendant and plaintiff?

My notes state that a previous Barbri answer said she many only assert permissive claims to the plaintiff, but just answered a question that is stating she may assert compulsory and permissive claims to the defendant.

Pls help.

[Calvin Murphy]

Does someone have examples of a superseding cause that would cut off liability from a tortfeasor except criminal acts?

I'm also a little unclear on this. If Defendant is driving 90mph in the desert and a jet engine falls from the sky crushing Passenger P, I assume that's the sort of thing that counts. If D had been going the speed limit, the engine would have dropped well before they got to that spot...so there is causation, but no legal causation.

[worditwrite]

Question about property. Speifically fixtures.

I solved problem 14 on Emmanuels 5th edition. Facts: life estate to A, then to B. A tells B they are installing fixture, A dies. Then A's executor removes fixture, B sues to have it reinstalled. Answer: Executor can remove fixture here b/c representative is permitted to remove before A leaves the estate or shortly thereafter.

My confusion stems from an earlier Barbri question I did, which suggested that a person renting a property must remove their added fixture (without damaging the property) before the rental period ends, and that the added fixture becomes part of the property if not removed by the end of the rental.

What gives? Is there a different rule depending on whether the fixture is added by a life-estate holder versus a renting tenant?

If I recall correctly, you get a reasonable period of time to remove fixtures if you die (what I recall from the lecture a few weeks ago, but it's not in my bar prep's company's outlines). I don't think it matters if you're a tenant vs. a life estate, as they are the same for these purposes. Also, with trade fixtures, CL is that you must remove by end of lease, but most states don't follow that and give you a reasonable time to remove after the lease ends.

When an owner attaches a chattel to real ppty, it is the subjective intent of the owner at the time they attach the chattel that determines if it is a fixture or not. Death doesn't change that rule, but the estate has a reasonable time to remove the chattel if the owners intent was not to annex the chattel to real ppty. If the chattel is not removed in a reasonable time it becomes a fixture. As for Tenants: A tenant is presumed not to have intended to annex a chattel when attaching it to real ppty, but must remove the chattel before the lease term ends, unless to do so would create an unreasonable cost to repair if the chattel is removed. If it is not removed prior to termination of the lease the chattel is said to be annexed to the real ppty and becomes a fixture.

[BVest]

Are the steps in front of a government building a public (like sidewalks) or limited use forum? Adaptibar says its public.

They're a public forum. Think of it this way, could the government limit the use of the steps to certain types of people? If so, it's a limited public forum. As an example, the city could not close its city hall steps to non-residents expressing themselves, but if the city also has conference rooms available in city hall for meetings, it could limit use of the of the conference rooms to residents of the city.

Hey Bvest, check barbri's Con law set 6 question 15, Barbri thinks the steps in front of a government building are non-public/limited public forums. They say VP neutral and rational basis applies.

Fair enough. I stand corrected. Apparently they're like the conference rooms.

[ndp1234]

Are the steps in front of a government building a public (like sidewalks) or limited use forum? Adaptibar says its public.

They're a public forum. Think of it this way, could the government limit the use of the steps to certain types of people? If so, it's a limited public forum. As an example, the city could not close its city hall steps to non-residents expressing themselves, but if the city also has conference rooms available in city hall for meetings, it could limit use of the of the conference rooms to residents of the city.

Hey Bvest, check barbri's Con law set 6 question 15, Barbri thinks the steps in front of a government building are non-public/limited public forums. They say VP neutral and rational basis applies.

Fair enough. I stand corrected. Apparently they're like the conference rooms.

Not all government steps are considered public fora. If it's just like a government office building, like the IRS, then it's limited public forum. But legislative buildings and typically elected official buildings are public fora.

[mvp99]

Are the steps in front of a government building a public (like sidewalks) or limited use forum? Adaptibar says its public.

They're a public forum. Think of it this way, could the government limit the use of the steps to certain types of people? If so, it's a limited public forum. As an example, the city could not close its city hall steps to non-residents expressing themselves, but if the city also has conference rooms available in city hall for meetings, it could limit use of the of the conference rooms to residents of the city.

Hey Bvest, check barbri's Con law set 6 question 15, Barbri thinks the steps in front of a government building are non-public/limited public forums. They say VP neutral and rational basis applies.

Fair enough. I stand corrected. Apparently they're like the conference rooms.

For all I know barbri could be wrong. What the previous poster said sounds right but it's not a distinction they taught us.

[BVest]

Does someone have examples of a superseding cause that would cut off liability from a tortfeasor except criminal acts?

I was going to type something, but when I checked to make sure I was right I saw that Wikipedia actually has a couple good examples.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intervening_cause

And I may be misremembering from Torts, but hospital negligence is foreseeable, so while it's intervening and introduces other possible defendants (usually with deep pockets), some other things may not be.

Example 1:
Defendant negligently crashes into Plaintiff's car, injuring plaintiff leg. Ambulance takes plaintiff to the hospital. Doctor orders 10 cc of drug; nurse administers 100 cc. Plaintiff is left in permanent vegetative state. Defendant can be on the hook for the damages caused at the hospital because, even though the hospital was negligent, hospital negligence is foreseeable. (Of course, hospital gets added as a defendant here as well).

Example 2:
Defendant negligently crashes into Plaintiff's car, injuring plaintiff leg. Ambulance takes plaintiff to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, a giant sinkhole opens in the road in front of the ambulance. Ambulance falls in and Plaintiff is left in permanent vegetative state. I'm pretty sure that would qualify as superseding.