salvage wrote:Just came across a weird Evidence question re dying declarations. The answer implies that the declarant needs to actually know that the statement is correct about the person who killed him. It says that "mere suspicion that the defendant tampered w/ his brakes is insufficient. As well-founded as such a suspicion may be, a statement based on mere suspicion rather than actual knowledge does not constitute a statement concerning the cause or circumstance of an impending death for purposes of the dying declaration exception."
This seems like bullshit to me. Anyone have any idea?
Sorry, I just don't buy that answer's rule statement (maybe my understanding is incomplete though based on the info int he fact pattern)
I mean the FRE 804(b) rule states, "In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances."
Nowhere does it say that such statement need to be from actual knowledge (and couldn't find that in the comments or MBE outline). It just seems to me that even a suspicion constitutes a statement made about the cause of the death--albeit a significantly weaker assertion than one based on actual knowledge (but that goes to the persuasiveness of it, not its admissibility, right?
Anyone have any resource or evidence (lol) that points to the contrary?