Pennoyer: irrational fears of 1Ls who did well last semester Forum

[jp0094]

my prop professor included a personal property essay. All was great, except we never covered personal property....

WTF

I think the point was to apply real property principles that we knew to something we didn't...to see how we though they would apply? I guess?

[Big Shrimpin]

.

[seespotrun]

--ImageRemoved--

Law review and future, c est la vie...

Especially since you spelled "hos" wrong. Oh haiiii BigShrimpin......

[Attucks]

Feeling at home in this thread. The last month of my life has been decidedly disastrous.

[Big Shrimpin]

Yeh, see what I did there?

accomplishment, ftl

[Matthies]

--ImageRemoved--

Law review and future, c est la vie...

Especially since you spelled "hos" wrong. Oh haiiii BigShrimpin......

Speaking of ho's

406 F.3d 857

We begin with the facts. Pamela Hayden agreed to become an informant for local law enforcement after being arrested on drug charges. In December of 2002, she made two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Darron Murphy, Jr., which led to his arrest.
On the evening of May 29, 2003, Hayden was smoking crack with three other folks at a trailer park home on Chain of Rocks Road in Granite City, Illinois. Murphy, Sr. , who had sold drugs to Hayden several years earlier, showed up later that night. He was friendly at first, but he soon called Hayden a "snitch bitch hoe" (footnote 1) and hit her in the head with the back of his hand. He said he saw her name in discovery materials from his son's criminal case and that she was responsible for putting him in jail. He put a gun -- a small chrome-plated one -- to her head and said he was going to kill her for putting his son in jail. He said this would be her last night and her body would be found in a ditch. Murphy then placed several calls, telling Hayden he was calling his people to get someone to dispose of her car.

(footnote 1) The trial transcript quotes Ms. Hayden as saying Murphy called her a snitch bitch "hoe." A "hoe," of course, is a tool used for weeding and gardening. We think the court reporter, unfamiliar with rap music (perhaps thankfully so), misunderstood Hayden's response. We have taken the liberty of changing "hoe" to "ho," a staple of rap music vernacular as, for example, when Ludacris raps "You doin' ho activities with ho tendencies."

[Big Shrimpin]

^^^Yes.

[Always Credited]

--ImageRemoved--

Law review and future, c est la vie...

Especially since you spelled "hos" wrong. Oh haiiii BigShrimpin......

Speaking of ho's

406 F.3d 857

We begin with the facts. Pamela Hayden agreed to become an informant for local law enforcement after being arrested on drug charges. In December of 2002, she made two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Darron Murphy, Jr., which led to his arrest.
On the evening of May 29, 2003, Hayden was smoking crack with three other folks at a trailer park home on Chain of Rocks Road in Granite City, Illinois. Murphy, Sr. , who had sold drugs to Hayden several years earlier, showed up later that night. He was friendly at first, but he soon called Hayden a "snitch bitch hoe" (footnote 1) and hit her in the head with the back of his hand. He said he saw her name in discovery materials from his son's criminal case and that she was responsible for putting him in jail. He put a gun -- a small chrome-plated one -- to her head and said he was going to kill her for putting his son in jail. He said this would be her last night and her body would be found in a ditch. Murphy then placed several calls, telling Hayden he was calling his people to get someone to dispose of her car.

(footnote 1) The trial transcript quotes Ms. Hayden as saying Murphy called her a snitch bitch "hoe." A "hoe," of course, is a tool used for weeding and gardening. We think the court reporter, unfamiliar with rap music (perhaps thankfully so), misunderstood Hayden's response. We have taken the liberty of changing "hoe" to "ho," a staple of rap music vernacular as, for example, when Ludacris raps "You doin' ho activities with ho tendencies."

Matthies...you've won the internet

[Matthies]

--ImageRemoved--

Law review and future, c est la vie...

Especially since you spelled "hos" wrong. Oh haiiii BigShrimpin......

Speaking of ho's

406 F.3d 857

We begin with the facts. Pamela Hayden agreed to become an informant for local law enforcement after being arrested on drug charges. In December of 2002, she made two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Darron Murphy, Jr., which led to his arrest.
On the evening of May 29, 2003, Hayden was smoking crack with three other folks at a trailer park home on Chain of Rocks Road in Granite City, Illinois. Murphy, Sr. , who had sold drugs to Hayden several years earlier, showed up later that night. He was friendly at first, but he soon called Hayden a "snitch bitch hoe" (footnote 1) and hit her in the head with the back of his hand. He said he saw her name in discovery materials from his son's criminal case and that she was responsible for putting him in jail. He put a gun -- a small chrome-plated one -- to her head and said he was going to kill her for putting his son in jail. He said this would be her last night and her body would be found in a ditch. Murphy then placed several calls, telling Hayden he was calling his people to get someone to dispose of her car.

(footnote 1) The trial transcript quotes Ms. Hayden as saying Murphy called her a snitch bitch "hoe." A "hoe," of course, is a tool used for weeding and gardening. We think the court reporter, unfamiliar with rap music (perhaps thankfully so), misunderstood Hayden's response. We have taken the liberty of changing "hoe" to "ho," a staple of rap music vernacular as, for example, when Ludacris raps "You doin' ho activities with ho tendencies."

Matthies...you've won the internet

No, I have better give me a second to dig it up from my funny ass cases file

[Always Credited]

Waiting anxiously for more lulz

[Matthies]

JOHN W. BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, v. UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC.; CORONADO, in rem; and PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. G-00-558

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, GALVESTON DIVISION

2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962 June 26, 2001, Decided June 27, 2001, Entered

DISPOSITION: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED.

COUNSEL: For JOHN W BRADSHAW, plaintiff: Harold Joseph Eisenman, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX.

For CORONADO, UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC., defendants: Ronald L White, White Mackillop et al, Houston, TX.

For PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, defendant: Charles Wayne Lyman, Giessel Barker & Lyman, Houston, TX.

For UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC., cross-claimant: Ronald L White, White Mackillop et al, Houston, TX.

For PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, cross-defendant: Charles Wayne Lyman, Giessel Barker & Lyman, Houston, TX.

JUDGE: SAMUEL B. KENT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION:

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained while working aboard the M/V CORONADO. Now before the Court is Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company's ("Phillips") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

I. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff John W. Bradshaw claims that he was working as a Jones Act seaman aboard the M/V CORONADO on January 4, 1999. The CORONADO was not at sea on January 4, 1999, but instead sat [*2] docked at a Phillips' facility in Freeport, Texas. Plaintiff alleges that he "sustained injuries to his body in the course and scope of his employment." The injuries are said to have "occurred as a proximate result of the unsafe and unseaworthy condition of the tugboat CORONADO and its appurtenances while docked at the Phillips/Freeport
Dock."

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, which added Phillips as a Defendant, provides no further information about the manner in which he suffered injury. However, by way of his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff now avers that "he was forced to climb on a piling or dolphin to leave the vessel at the time he was injured." This, in combination with Plaintiff's Complaint, represents the totality of the information available to the Court respecting the potential liability of Defendant Phillips.

Six days after filing his one-page Response, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Opposition to Phillips Petroleum Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although considerably lengthier, the Supplement provides no further illumination of the factual basis for Plaintiff's claims versus Phillips. Defendant now contends, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims bars this action.

Plaintiff suffered injury on January 4, 1999 and filed suit in this Court on September 15, 2000. However, Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint to add Defendant Phillips until March 28, 2001, indisputably more than two-years after the date of his alleged injury. Plaintiff now responds that he timely sued Phillips, contending that the three-year federal statute for maritime personal injuries applies to his action.

Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact — complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words — to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task of deciphering their submissions.

With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor's edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, when a defendant moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff must bear the burden of producing some evidence to create a fact issue some element of defendant's asserted affirmative defense.

Defendant begins the descent into Alice's Wonderland by submitting a Motion that relies upon only one legal authority. The Motion cites a Fifth Circuit case which stands for the whopping proposition that a federal court sitting in Texas applies the Texas statutes of limitations to certain state and federal law claims. That is all well and good — the Court is quite fond of the Erie doctrine; indeed there is talk of little else around both the Canal and this Court's water cooler. Defendant, however, does not even cite to Erie, but to a mere successor case, and further fails to even begin to analyze why the Court should approach the shores of Erie.

Finally, Defendant does not even provide a cite to its desired Texas limitation statute. A more bumbling approach is difficult to conceive — but wait folks. There's More!

Defendant submitted a Reply brief, on June 11, 2001, after the Court had already drafted, but not finalized, this Order. In a regretful effort to be thorough, the Court reviewed this submission. It too fails to cite to either the Texas statute of limitations or any Fifth Circuit cases discussing maritime law liability for Plaintiff's claims versus Phillips.

Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to maritime tort claims. Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff "cites" to a single case from the Fourth Circuit.

Plaintiff's citation, however, points to a nonexistent Volume "1886" of the Federal Reporter Third Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page decision. Ultimately, to the Court's dismay after reviewing the opinion, it stands simply for the bombshell proposition that torts committed on navigable waters (in this case an alleged defamation committed by the controversial G. Gordon Liddy aboard a cruise ship at sea) require the application of general maritime rather than state tort law. See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1999) (What the ..)?!

The Court cannot even begin to comprehend why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if Plaintiff's counsel chose the opinion by throwing long range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent volume!). And though the Court often gives great heed to dicta from courts as far flung as those of Manitoba, it finds this case unpersuasive. There is nothing in Plaintiff's cited case about ingress or egress between a vessel and a dock, although counsel must have been thinking that Mr. Liddy must have had both ingress and egress from the cruise ship at some docking facility, before uttering his fateful words.

Further, as noted above, Plaintiff has submitted a Supplemental Opposition to Defendant's Motion. This Supplement is longer than Plaintiff's purported Response, cites more cases, several constituting binding authority from either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court, and actually includes attachments which purport to be evidence. However, this is all that can be said positively for Plaintiff's Supplement, which does nothing to explain why, on the facts of this case, Plaintiff has an admiralty claim against Phillips (which probably makes some sense because Plaintiff doesn't).

Plaintiff seems to rely on the fact that he has pled Rule 9(h) and stated an admiralty claim versus the vessel and his employer to demonstrate that maritime law applies to Phillips. This bootstrapping argument does not work; Plaintiff must properly invoke admiralty law versus each Defendant discretely. Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff's supplemental submission, the Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon — Brick Red is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the mustard splotched about Plaintiff's briefing. But at the end of the day, even if you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.

Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup land. As vaguely alluded to by the parties, the issue in this case turns upon which law — state or maritime — applies to each of Plaintiff's potential claims versus Defendant Phillips. And despite Plaintiff's and Defendant's joint, heroic efforts to obscure it, the answer to this question is readily ascertained.

The Fifth Circuit has held that "absent a maritime status between the parties, a dock owner's duty to crew members of a vessel using thedock is defined by the application of state law, not maritime law. Specifically, maritime law does not impose a duty on the dock owner to provide a means of safe ingress or egress. Therefore, because maritime law does not create a duty on the part of Defendant Phillips vis-a-vis Plaintiff, any claim Plaintiff does have versus Phillips must necessarily arise under state law. Take heed and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls — the Court was able to state the issue and its resolution in one paragraph ... despite dozens of pages of gibberish from the parties to the contrary!

The Court, therefore ... applies the Texas statute of limitations. Texas has adopted a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases. Plaintiff failed to file his action versus Defendant Phillips within that two-year time frame. Plaintiff has offered no justification, such as the discovery rule or other similar tolling doctrines, for this failure. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims versus Defendant Phillips were not timely filed and are barred. Defendant
Phillips' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant Phillips are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Final Judgment reflecting such will be entered in due course.

II. CONCLUSION

After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having received no useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court has endeavored, primarily based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good crayon seen in both parties' briefing (and the inexplicable odor of wet dog emanating from such) the Court believes it has satisfactorily resolved this matter. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

At this juncture, Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus his alleged Jones Act employer, Defendant Unity Marine Corporation, Inc. However, it is well known around these parts that Unity Marine's lawyer is equally likable and has been writing crisply in ink since the second grade. Some old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The Court cannot speak to the veracity of such loose talk, but out of caution, the Court suggests that Plaintiff's lovable counsel had best upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what's left of the stubs of his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping, spine-tingling action.

In either case, the Court cautions Plaintiff's counsel not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in hand — he could put his eye out.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE this 26th day of June, 2001, at Galveston, Texas.

SAMUEL B. KENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


(Note: Judge kent is now serving 33 months in the fed pen for lying about sexual miscondut, rummor is he refused to resgin while in jail)

[Always Credited]

JOHN W. BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, v. UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC.; CORONADO, in rem; and PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. G-00-558

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, GALVESTON DIVISION

2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962 June 26, 2001, Decided June 27, 2001, Entered

DISPOSITION: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED.

COUNSEL: For JOHN W BRADSHAW, plaintiff: Harold Joseph Eisenman, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX.

For CORONADO, UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC., defendants: Ronald L White, White Mackillop et al, Houston, TX.

For PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, defendant: Charles Wayne Lyman, Giessel Barker & Lyman, Houston, TX.

For UNITY MARINE CORPORATION, INC., cross-claimant: Ronald L White, White Mackillop et al, Houston, TX.

For PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, cross-defendant: Charles Wayne Lyman, Giessel Barker & Lyman, Houston, TX.

JUDGE: SAMUEL B. KENT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION:

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained while working aboard the M/V CORONADO. Now before the Court is Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company's ("Phillips") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

I. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff John W. Bradshaw claims that he was working as a Jones Act seaman aboard the M/V CORONADO on January 4, 1999. The CORONADO was not at sea on January 4, 1999, but instead sat [*2] docked at a Phillips' facility in Freeport, Texas. Plaintiff alleges that he "sustained injuries to his body in the course and scope of his employment." The injuries are said to have "occurred as a proximate result of the unsafe and unseaworthy condition of the tugboat CORONADO and its appurtenances while docked at the Phillips/Freeport
Dock."

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, which added Phillips as a Defendant, provides no further information about the manner in which he suffered injury. However, by way of his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff now avers that "he was forced to climb on a piling or dolphin to leave the vessel at the time he was injured." This, in combination with Plaintiff's Complaint, represents the totality of the information available to the Court respecting the potential liability of Defendant Phillips.

Six days after filing his one-page Response, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Opposition to Phillips Petroleum Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although considerably lengthier, the Supplement provides no further illumination of the factual basis for Plaintiff's claims versus Phillips. Defendant now contends, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims bars this action.

Plaintiff suffered injury on January 4, 1999 and filed suit in this Court on September 15, 2000. However, Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint to add Defendant Phillips until March 28, 2001, indisputably more than two-years after the date of his alleged injury. Plaintiff now responds that he timely sued Phillips, contending that the three-year federal statute for maritime personal injuries applies to his action.

Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact — complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words — to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task of deciphering their submissions.

With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor's edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, when a defendant moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff must bear the burden of producing some evidence to create a fact issue some element of defendant's asserted affirmative defense.

Defendant begins the descent into Alice's Wonderland by submitting a Motion that relies upon only one legal authority. The Motion cites a Fifth Circuit case which stands for the whopping proposition that a federal court sitting in Texas applies the Texas statutes of limitations to certain state and federal law claims. That is all well and good — the Court is quite fond of the Erie doctrine; indeed there is talk of little else around both the Canal and this Court's water cooler. Defendant, however, does not even cite to Erie, but to a mere successor case, and further fails to even begin to analyze why the Court should approach the shores of Erie.

Finally, Defendant does not even provide a cite to its desired Texas limitation statute. A more bumbling approach is difficult to conceive — but wait folks. There's More!

Defendant submitted a Reply brief, on June 11, 2001, after the Court had already drafted, but not finalized, this Order. In a regretful effort to be thorough, the Court reviewed this submission. It too fails to cite to either the Texas statute of limitations or any Fifth Circuit cases discussing maritime law liability for Plaintiff's claims versus Phillips.

Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to maritime tort claims. Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff "cites" to a single case from the Fourth Circuit.

Plaintiff's citation, however, points to a nonexistent Volume "1886" of the Federal Reporter Third Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page decision. Ultimately, to the Court's dismay after reviewing the opinion, it stands simply for the bombshell proposition that torts committed on navigable waters (in this case an alleged defamation committed by the controversial G. Gordon Liddy aboard a cruise ship at sea) require the application of general maritime rather than state tort law. See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1999) (What the ..)?!

The Court cannot even begin to comprehend why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if Plaintiff's counsel chose the opinion by throwing long range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent volume!). And though the Court often gives great heed to dicta from courts as far flung as those of Manitoba, it finds this case unpersuasive. There is nothing in Plaintiff's cited case about ingress or egress between a vessel and a dock, although counsel must have been thinking that Mr. Liddy must have had both ingress and egress from the cruise ship at some docking facility, before uttering his fateful words.

Further, as noted above, Plaintiff has submitted a Supplemental Opposition to Defendant's Motion. This Supplement is longer than Plaintiff's purported Response, cites more cases, several constituting binding authority from either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court, and actually includes attachments which purport to be evidence. However, this is all that can be said positively for Plaintiff's Supplement, which does nothing to explain why, on the facts of this case, Plaintiff has an admiralty claim against Phillips (which probably makes some sense because Plaintiff doesn't).

Plaintiff seems to rely on the fact that he has pled Rule 9(h) and stated an admiralty claim versus the vessel and his employer to demonstrate that maritime law applies to Phillips. This bootstrapping argument does not work; Plaintiff must properly invoke admiralty law versus each Defendant discretely. Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff's supplemental submission, the Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon — Brick Red is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the mustard splotched about Plaintiff's briefing. But at the end of the day, even if you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.

Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup land. As vaguely alluded to by the parties, the issue in this case turns upon which law — state or maritime — applies to each of Plaintiff's potential claims versus Defendant Phillips. And despite Plaintiff's and Defendant's joint, heroic efforts to obscure it, the answer to this question is readily ascertained.

The Fifth Circuit has held that "absent a maritime status between the parties, a dock owner's duty to crew members of a vessel using thedock is defined by the application of state law, not maritime law. Specifically, maritime law does not impose a duty on the dock owner to provide a means of safe ingress or egress. Therefore, because maritime law does not create a duty on the part of Defendant Phillips vis-a-vis Plaintiff, any claim Plaintiff does have versus Phillips must necessarily arise under state law. Take heed and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls — the Court was able to state the issue and its resolution in one paragraph ... despite dozens of pages of gibberish from the parties to the contrary!

The Court, therefore ... applies the Texas statute of limitations. Texas has adopted a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases. Plaintiff failed to file his action versus Defendant Phillips within that two-year time frame. Plaintiff has offered no justification, such as the discovery rule or other similar tolling doctrines, for this failure. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims versus Defendant Phillips were not timely filed and are barred. Defendant
Phillips' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant Phillips are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Final Judgment reflecting such will be entered in due course.

II. CONCLUSION

After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having received no useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court has endeavored, primarily based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good crayon seen in both parties' briefing (and the inexplicable odor of wet dog emanating from such) the Court believes it has satisfactorily resolved this matter. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

At this juncture, Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus his alleged Jones Act employer, Defendant Unity Marine Corporation, Inc. However, it is well known around these parts that Unity Marine's lawyer is equally likable and has been writing crisply in ink since the second grade. Some old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The Court cannot speak to the veracity of such loose talk, but out of caution, the Court suggests that Plaintiff's lovable counsel had best upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what's left of the stubs of his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping, spine-tingling action.

In either case, the Court cautions Plaintiff's counsel not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in hand — he could put his eye out.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE this 26th day of June, 2001, at Galveston, Texas.

SAMUEL B. KENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


(Note: Judge kent is now serving 33 months in the fed pen for lying about sexual miscondut, rummor is he refused to resgin while in jail)

--ImageRemoved--

Ride the dolphin, use the crayons. Thanks for the lulz, my friend

[arhmcpo]

hmm...yesterday I went to take my crim law exam, and when I booted up Softest on my Laptop...waddya know a "Runtime Error", sprint up to the IT department, who says I would have to call the company to fix, sprint back down to my room in time for the start of the 2 hrs of essays which I had to handwrite old-school-bluebook style. The first time I've had to handwrite a final and it feels like the kiss of death...Goodbye Law Review...Goodbye Sweet Sweet Beverly Hills Mansion...sooo long.

.....
.....
.....
FML

[Big Shrimpin]

.

[vanwinkle]

--ImageRemoved--

Law review and future, c est la vie...

Especially since you spelled "hos" wrong. Oh haiiii BigShrimpin......

Speaking of ho's

406 F.3d 857

We begin with the facts. Pamela Hayden agreed to become an informant for local law enforcement after being arrested on drug charges. In December of 2002, she made two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Darron Murphy, Jr., which led to his arrest.
On the evening of May 29, 2003, Hayden was smoking crack with three other folks at a trailer park home on Chain of Rocks Road in Granite City, Illinois. Murphy, Sr. , who had sold drugs to Hayden several years earlier, showed up later that night. He was friendly at first, but he soon called Hayden a "snitch bitch hoe" (footnote 1) and hit her in the head with the back of his hand. He said he saw her name in discovery materials from his son's criminal case and that she was responsible for putting him in jail. He put a gun -- a small chrome-plated one -- to her head and said he was going to kill her for putting his son in jail. He said this would be her last night and her body would be found in a ditch. Murphy then placed several calls, telling Hayden he was calling his people to get someone to dispose of her car.

(footnote 1) The trial transcript quotes Ms. Hayden as saying Murphy called her a snitch bitch "hoe." A "hoe," of course, is a tool used for weeding and gardening. We think the court reporter, unfamiliar with rap music (perhaps thankfully so), misunderstood Hayden's response. We have taken the liberty of changing "hoe" to "ho," a staple of rap music vernacular as, for example, when Ludacris raps "You doin' ho activities with ho tendencies."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoMspJqqVcA

[stinger35]

hmm...yesterday I went to take my crim law exam, and when I booted up Softest on my Laptop...waddya know a "Runtime Error", sprint up to the IT department, who says I would have to call the company to fix, sprint back down to my room in time for the start of the 2 hrs of essays which I had to handwrite old-school-bluebook style. The first time I've had to handwrite a final and it feels like the kiss of death...Goodbye Law Review...Goodbye Sweet Sweet Beverly Hills Mansion...sooo long.

.....
.....
.....
FML

This has happened to at least one person in every exam I've had so far. It really is scary. I remember the first girl it happened to said so nonchalantly "eh, i'll just hand write it" - that was our first exam ever, I was in utter disbelief. This week the kid was freaking out and so pissed but I would probably be worse. Law schools need to figure out a better way to handle this. (Allowing softest on mac's, as they are supposed to next fall, would be step 1 since PC's are 99% shit)

[ak362]

Why I have I not discovered this thread sooner... oh right, I've been busy with finals.

Nevertheless, I don't have the confidence in my exams as I did last semester. I had an exam today and had a bit of a mini-meltdown yesterday over an exam I took three days ago. It's nervewracking - that's what it is.

[stinger35]

HEY, A'nold, hoping you read this:

I was reading the thread and thinking to myself, hmm, this such A'nold's style but he really hasn't been around too much in here (besides a few posts the other day), which got me to thinking, thats probably because he's studying for exams. Then I started thinking, wow, I should be studying for exams too. Is the fact that I am on here posting and he is not indicative of my study habits? Will I ACTUALLY bomb this semester because I am not studying as much as I should like A'nold is?

I could go on, but you get the point. Figured this belonged in this thread and that you would get a kick out of it. Back to red wine and con law.

[OperaSoprano]

HEY, A'nold, hoping you read this:

I was reading the thread and thinking to myself, hmm, this such A'nold's style but he really hasn't been around too much in here (besides a few posts the other day), which got me to thinking, thats probably because he's studying for exams. Then I started thinking, wow, I should be studying for exams too. Is the fact that I am on here posting and he is not indicative of my study habits? Will I ACTUALLY bomb this semester because I am not studying as much as I should like A'nold is?

I could go on, but you get the point. Figured this belonged in this thread and that you would get a kick out of it. Back to red wine and con law.

Okay, I have to ask it: how can people drink and study? My classmates attempted to give me beer earlier this evening, but I had to turn it down. I can drink the beer, or I can take a property practice exam. Both cannot go on simultaneously.

[stinger35]

HEY, A'nold, hoping you read this:

I was reading the thread and thinking to myself, hmm, this such A'nold's style but he really hasn't been around too much in here (besides a few posts the other day), which got me to thinking, thats probably because he's studying for exams. Then I started thinking, wow, I should be studying for exams too. Is the fact that I am on here posting and he is not indicative of my study habits? Will I ACTUALLY bomb this semester because I am not studying as much as I should like A'nold is?

I could go on, but you get the point. Figured this belonged in this thread and that you would get a kick out of it. Back to red wine and con law.

Okay, I have to ask it: how can people drink and study? My classmates attempted to give me beer earlier this evening, but I had to turn it down. I can drink the beer, or I can take a property practice exam. Both cannot go on simultaneously.

Well, in short, no. I can't drink and study. I DEFINITELY can't study hungover. However, over the past two weeks I've been having a few glasses of wine while studying past midnight. Makes me feel like I am 1) doing something social (which I'm not) and 2) helps me get to sleep once I wanna quit. I usually stop though before I get drunk because then studying will be pointless and my head will hurt the next day.

[arhmcpo]

Anyone else feel like they should have been diagnosed with ADHD when it comes time to sit down and study for these last Finals...Civ Pro you are a cruel mistress.

[stinger35]

Anyone else feel like they should have been diagnosed with ADHD when it comes time to sit down and study for these last Finals...Civ Pro you are a cruel mistress.

What a hooker. Civpro just seduced me last week. I swear if that bitch gave me something (other than an A), I'll sue.

[OperaSoprano]

HEY, A'nold, hoping you read this:

I was reading the thread and thinking to myself, hmm, this such A'nold's style but he really hasn't been around too much in here (besides a few posts the other day), which got me to thinking, thats probably because he's studying for exams. Then I started thinking, wow, I should be studying for exams too. Is the fact that I am on here posting and he is not indicative of my study habits? Will I ACTUALLY bomb this semester because I am not studying as much as I should like A'nold is?

I could go on, but you get the point. Figured this belonged in this thread and that you would get a kick out of it. Back to red wine and con law.

Okay, I have to ask it: how can people drink and study? My classmates attempted to give me beer earlier this evening, but I had to turn it down. I can drink the beer, or I can take a property practice exam. Both cannot go on simultaneously.

Well, in short, no. I can't drink and study. I DEFINITELY can't study hungover. However, over the past two weeks I've been having a few glasses of wine while studying past midnight. Makes me feel like I am 1) doing something social (which I'm not) and 2) helps me get to sleep once I wanna quit. I usually stop though before I get drunk because then studying will be pointless and my head will hurt the next day.

Jealous. FML for being at a weight where a few glasses of wine will make me silly drunk, especially if I'm not eating too. Raise your glass for me! Let's toast straight As for everyone here in Disco's thread.

[arhmcpo]

Anyone else feel like they should have been diagnosed with ADHD when it comes time to sit down and study for these last Finals...Civ Pro you are a cruel mistress.

What a hooker. Civpro just seduced me last week. I swear if that bitch gave me something (other than an A), I'll sue.

Even worse, at my school is it goes from 3 units to 2 for 2nd semester; so you work just as hard to maker her happy...but slutty-mc.-slutterson civ pro just gives you less.

[Leeroy Jenkins]

Anyone else feel like they should have been diagnosed with ADHD when it comes time to sit down and study for these last Finals...Civ Pro you are a cruel mistress.

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