General Evidence Thread Forum

[victortsoi]

I guess im getting hung up on this (copied from a harvard law site): United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1978) (222)

In teaching this case, we find it useful to ask the following questions:

(1) Could the Government have prosecuted Beechum in two counts, tried jointly: one count For stealing the silver dollar, the second for stealing the Sears credit cards?

(2) Could the prosecution in the trial of Beechum for stealing the silver dollar introduce evidence of the Sears credit cards as part of its casein-chief?

(3) Could Beechum, by testifying only about the silver dollar, avoid cross-examination about the Sears credit cards because such examination would be beyond the scope of the direct examination (FRE 611 (b))?

(4) Could Beechum, having testified about the silver dollar, successfully assert his fifth amendment privilege in response to questions about the Sears credit cards?

(5) Could the prosecution introduce extrinsic proof about the Sears credit cards if Beechum denied any knowledge of them?

All of these questions turn on the basic relevance analysis of the Sears credit cards to the question of whether Beechum knowingly and intentionally stole the silver dollar. If the evidence about the credit cards was relevant to the question of intent, then all the above questions are answered the Government's way.

The relevance of the credit card evidence is based on the kind of inferential logic that was involved in Rex v. Smith. A fact finder s ability to determine what happened with respect to each event is enhanced by considering both together.

It is important to see that the credit card evidence is asserted to be admissible because it relates to Beechum's intent in taking the silver dollar, not because it relates to Beechum's credibility. The credit card evidence does not show that Beechum is a liar unless one first concludes what happened. One could then conclude that Beechum had lied in his version of what happened, but the conclusion is at this point incidental and superfluous.

Judge Goldberg's dissent is artful but overdrawn. His argument that the majority's reading of Rule 404(b) conflicts with the language of Rules 609 and 608 obscures the point that is centrally important: Rule 404 deals with evidence that is directly relevant to what happened; Rules 608 and 609 deal with evidence that relates to the witness's (here the defendant's) character as a truth-teller, and thus only indirectly and circumstantially to what happened. The constraints of Rules 608 and 609 are consistent with and parallel to the constraints of Rule 405 with respect to proof of character evidence to be used circumstantially.

[northwood]

where are some good places to practice multiple choice questions? My school's library does not have a law in the flash series flashcards for this final... Are Cali lessons any good, or just a waste of time?


Just hoping for a C on this exam

[Andrews989]

Declarant Unavailable 804(a)(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; +

Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances.

^Really depends on whether declarant thought his death was imminent.

Right?

yes. but i also believe that the defendant has to then actually die within a reasonable timeframe from making this statement.

My understanding (according to my professor and various supplements) is that the defendant does NOT have to die. The defendant just has to reasonably believe death is imminent. Other limits on the rule is that it cannot be used in criminal cases (except homicide cases) and the declaration has to deal with the cause of death (someone on their death bed alleging someone breached a contract would not be admissible).

[northwood]

Declarant Unavailable 804(a)(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; +

Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances.

^Really depends on whether declarant thought his death was imminent.

Right?

yes. but i also believe that the defendant has to then actually die within a reasonable timeframe from making this statement.

My understanding (according to my professor and various supplements) is that the defendant does NOT have to die. The defendant just has to reasonably believe death is imminent. Other limits on the rule is that it cannot be used in criminal cases (except homicide cases) and the declaration has to deal with the cause of death (someone on their death bed alleging someone breached a contract would not be admissible).

yes. the defendant does not have to die.