not that it's two separate tests, but that it's more of a two-step single test. (sorry for being vague.) first look at the existence of minimum contacts and then look at whether asserting jurisdiction over D would be reasonable (i.e., not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). at least, i know a couple of civ pro profs approach minimum contacts like that from my school. it's just confusing to me, since it seems like they can be conflated at times.malleus discentium wrote:Cardozo is correct based on the language of International Shoe: "he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" They aren't two separate tests.Brut wrote: @cardozo
idk if contacts and fair play/substantial justice can always be conflated like that
contacts might be undisputed, yet there might be no J because of a lack of interest of the forum state (asahi), or a burden on D so grave as to be unconstitutional (burger king)
we define minimum contacts as any D that purposefully avails itself to the forum state. it can even be a minor purposeful availment (e.g., McGee, where D's purposeful availment was a single letter asking whether P wanted to continue business). however, purposeful availment seems also to go to the second factor of the test, whether jurisdiction is "reasonableness" or fair, since in Hanson, D's continuous correspondence with P wasn't purposeful availment... because P's moving to FL was a "unilateral action." D was just maintaining existing business with P.
OR do we define minimum contacts as any contact and then determine whether it's reasonable/fair + substantially just by looking at purposeful availment? that might bridge our 1 test v. 2 test (or two-factor single test) distinction.