Top Law Schools

I thought I understood RAP, but apparently not (unless the answer to this Barbri question is completely wrong). Here is the question:

The owner of a ranch in fee simple died and left the property to his daughter "my daughter, her heirs and assigns, but if my son is living 25 years from the date of my death, then to my son, his heirs, and assigns." At the time of the owner's death, the son was one year old.

Is the grant to the son valid?



My analysis was as follows: At the time of the owner's death, RAP starts to run. The son was 1 year old at that time, and therefore, the interest is not certain to vest or fail within 21 years (because the daughter might still be alive at that time).

Barbri says that the conveyance to the son is valid because it vests, if at all, within a life in being.

Can someone explain this to me?

The owner isn't the validating life here, the daughter or son is. It has to be someone currently alive against whom the "life in being" can be measured - not specifically the grantor.

Capitol_Idea wrote:The owner isn't the validating life here, the daughter or son is. It has to be someone currently alive against whom the "life in being" can be measured - not specifically the grantor.

How do you select who the measuring life is? Perhaps that's where I'm getting confused.

doctoroflaw91 wrote:

Capitol_Idea wrote:The owner isn't the validating life here, the daughter or son is. It has to be someone currently alive against whom the "life in being" can be measured - not specifically the grantor.

How do you select who the measuring life is? Perhaps that's where I'm getting confused.

The youngest grantee of a closed class usually works as a rule of thumb for me.

doctoroflaw91 wrote:I thought I understood RAP, but apparently not (unless the answer to this Barbri question is completely wrong). Here is the question:

The owner of a ranch in fee simple died and left the property to his daughter "my daughter, her heirs and assigns, but if my son is living 25 years from the date of my death, then to my son, his heirs, and assigns." At the time of the owner's death, the son was one year old.

Is the grant to the son valid?



My analysis was as follows: At the time of the owner's death, RAP starts to run. The son was 1 year old at that time, and therefore, the interest is not certain to vest or fail within 21 years (because the daughter might still be alive at that time).

Barbri says that the conveyance to the son is valid because it vests, if at all, within a life in being.

Can someone explain this to me?

This is a tricky one. Theoretically, at the time of O's death, the property goes to his daughter or her heirs which become the measuring life (whoever is youngest) so at the time of her death or her heirs' in being's death which is the measuring life +21, the grant must either vest or fail. Everyone may die a day after O's death which would mean it would not vest w/i 21 years. Even if you use the son's measuring life, it still would not guarantee to vest or fail w/i 21 years. Not sure how this is valid.

If it was worded "to my daughter and her heirs then to my son if he reaches 22 from the date of my death" it would be ok since 22-1 = 21.

the only way this grant is valid is if you treat it as a vested remainder subject to divestment at which point RAP doesn't apply = grant valid.

But, the language of the grant does not (in my opinion create a vested interest) since it says "but if reaches 25 then". It would more naturally construed as vested if stated "to my son but if doesn't reach 25"

seasidemama wrote:

doctoroflaw91 wrote:I thought I understood RAP, but apparently not (unless the answer to this Barbri question is completely wrong). Here is the question:

The owner of a ranch in fee simple died and left the property to his daughter "my daughter, her heirs and assigns, but if my son is living 25 years from the date of my death, then to my son, his heirs, and assigns." At the time of the owner's death, the son was one year old.

Is the grant to the son valid?



My analysis was as follows: At the time of the owner's death, RAP starts to run. The son was 1 year old at that time, and therefore, the interest is not certain to vest or fail within 21 years (because the daughter might still be alive at that time).

Barbri says that the conveyance to the son is valid because it vests, if at all, within a life in being.

Can someone explain this to me?

This is a tricky one. Theoretically, at the time of O's death, the property goes to his daughter or her heirs which become the measuring life (whoever is youngest) so at the time of her death or her heirs' in being's death which is the measuring life +21, the grant must either vest or fail. Everyone may die a day after O's death which would mean it would not vest w/i 21 years. Even if you use the son's measuring life, it still would not guarantee to vest or fail w/i 21 years. Not sure how this is valid.

If it was worded "to my daughter and her heirs then to my son if he reaches 22 from the date of my death" it would be ok since 22-1 = 21.

the only way this grant is valid is if you treat it as a vested remainder subject to divestment at which point RAP doesn't apply = grant valid.

But, the language of the grant does not (in my opinion create a vested interest) since it says "but if reaches 25 then". It would more naturally construed as vested if stated "to my son but if doesn't reach 25"

I think this may be one of those Barbri questions that is teetering on the edge of being wrong. Whatever; moving on.

The son is a life in being at the time of the grant. Will you know whether the son lives until 25 years of the grantor's death within 21 years of the son's death? Of course.

RAP is nothing more than a logical proof.

The son can be his own measuring life because he was alive at the moment his father died, he was a life in being. (right?)

It's 21 years after the person croaks