Re: 2017 February California Bar Exam
Posted: Fri Feb 24, 2017 3:30 pm
How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?
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Improper distribution?Lawless! wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:I discussed agency authority. And I've been angst-ridden ever since about whether that's the right analysis for the question of a Director/Officer's liability for a corporate contract (as opposed to a principal's liability for a contract entered into by an agent). I've been thinking not, ever since the exam ended, and that I screwed up by spending time on authority that I should have been spent on de facto/de jure/estoppel corporate formation (based on what people here are saying though, not based on my memory of the question... was formation REALLY an issue or was the problem written away it was assumed to be ok??). I also completely missed the issue of piercing the veil, which was probably one of the most important on this question.Lawless! wrote:Curious as to how everyone approached Corp Q. Did you discuss Corp formation or agency authority for part 1. What about part 2 shareholder suits? And can't remember part 3....?
I think I hit everything else, and decently though. Any reassurances that 1) authority actually was worth some points to analyze and 2) an answer that omitted formation and pcv but was otherwise good could still be above a 55 would be much appreciated
(my other answers, if I recall right, had to do with respective duties, obligations and liabilities (with lots of focus on duty of care/biz judgment, duty to disclose, and limited liability in general, although I may have muddied the exception applications up a bit), and a bit on distribution order during dissolution/liquidation, and shareholders' rights to sue, including for when the proper steps aren't followed in a fundamental change to corporate structure. I also didn't go into much detail over the sale of XYZ supplies to the company other than it didn't violate a duty of loyalty since he got the board's ok)
I don't think formation was an issue bc the facts stated the corp was already a Corp entity. There were no facts to argue there was some defective formation and finding a general partnership. The question asked how Suppkier could hold Corp liable and A. So I discussed the agency for Director/officer authority to contract with 3rd P Supplier since president is an agent of the corp and reasonable for S to think A had authority. Thus Corp is liable for the k. And then Pvc to pierce Corp's veil and get to A personally bc under capitalization and alter ego.
Part 2- I discussed directors duties of loyalty for conflict tx with xyz and No disinterested board since the other members were his family, only other shareholder is B and terms likely aren't fair. Also duty of care for the same reasons and then taking inventory. Which is how B could bring direct and derivative suit to recovery losses to herself for stocks she paid for and the corp for the losses for A stealing stuff and the xyz tx and no BJR protection.
Part 3- distribution at dissolution and creditor priority but A's loan is subordinated bc of all his wrongdoing.
I don't think formation was an issue bc it was already in the facts and I didn't see anything about Corp fundamental changes. But I did miss the issue of improper distribution.
I did this:cal_pushed wrote:How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?
Just a minor issue. The corp had profits some years and losses some years and at the same time BOD were paying out profts. So you could argue beach of duty of care and loyalty since that its imprudent to make any sort of distributions when the corp isn't stable financially.cal_pushed wrote:Improper distribution?Lawless! wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:I discussed agency authority. And I've been angst-ridden ever since about whether that's the right analysis for the question of a Director/Officer's liability for a corporate contract (as opposed to a principal's liability for a contract entered into by an agent). I've been thinking not, ever since the exam ended, and that I screwed up by spending time on authority that I should have been spent on de facto/de jure/estoppel corporate formation (based on what people here are saying though, not based on my memory of the question... was formation REALLY an issue or was the problem written away it was assumed to be ok??). I also completely missed the issue of piercing the veil, which was probably one of the most important on this question.Lawless! wrote:Curious as to how everyone approached Corp Q. Did you discuss Corp formation or agency authority for part 1. What about part 2 shareholder suits? And can't remember part 3....?
I think I hit everything else, and decently though. Any reassurances that 1) authority actually was worth some points to analyze and 2) an answer that omitted formation and pcv but was otherwise good could still be above a 55 would be much appreciated
(my other answers, if I recall right, had to do with respective duties, obligations and liabilities (with lots of focus on duty of care/biz judgment, duty to disclose, and limited liability in general, although I may have muddied the exception applications up a bit), and a bit on distribution order during dissolution/liquidation, and shareholders' rights to sue, including for when the proper steps aren't followed in a fundamental change to corporate structure. I also didn't go into much detail over the sale of XYZ supplies to the company other than it didn't violate a duty of loyalty since he got the board's ok)
I don't think formation was an issue bc the facts stated the corp was already a Corp entity. There were no facts to argue there was some defective formation and finding a general partnership. The question asked how Suppkier could hold Corp liable and A. So I discussed the agency for Director/officer authority to contract with 3rd P Supplier since president is an agent of the corp and reasonable for S to think A had authority. Thus Corp is liable for the k. And then Pvc to pierce Corp's veil and get to A personally bc under capitalization and alter ego.
Part 2- I discussed directors duties of loyalty for conflict tx with xyz and No disinterested board since the other members were his family, only other shareholder is B and terms likely aren't fair. Also duty of care for the same reasons and then taking inventory. Which is how B could bring direct and derivative suit to recovery losses to herself for stocks she paid for and the corp for the losses for A stealing stuff and the xyz tx and no BJR protection.
Part 3- distribution at dissolution and creditor priority but A's loan is subordinated bc of all his wrongdoing.
I don't think formation was an issue bc it was already in the facts and I didn't see anything about Corp fundamental changes. But I did miss the issue of improper distribution.
lhanvt13 wrote:I did this:cal_pushed wrote:How did people frame their section and subsection headers for PT b? Like just I. Immunity; or did you guys forecast like: I. City likely Has/does not Immunity?
...
III. Whether City is liable for extensive damages due to QM and city no immunity
1) some damage stuff
2) some other damage stuff
3) fuckig damages
4) Conclusion: city damages
IV. Conclusion
City gonna regret cuz no immune, QM, and holy damages
Shit gonna be bad for city
---
armenianBEAUTY wrote:I agree w/ the need for "pushing" on this one. I felt like there weren't enough issues. The largest paragraph was all literally just L's attempts to communicate w/ C.cal_pushed wrote:What issues did people discuss for PR. Feel like I forced some. I went:
Attorney agreements
Contingency fees
Confidence
Competence
Diligence
Conflict
Concurrent conflict
Representation despite
Permissive withdrawal
Mandatory withdrawal
Anyway, my topics:
* I skipped fee agreement bc it said "valid agreement."
* Competence -- personal injury attorney doing slip & fall... no violation
* Keep client property safely -- dumbo stored clothes in his office closet... violation
* Duty not to obstruct access to evidence -- ruined clothes
* Duty to communicate
* Close relationship w/ opposing counsel
* Permissive withdrawal -- repugnant course of action
* Mandatory withdrawal -- possibly fraud using attorneys services
* (Non)duty to take cases (i.e. when C begged L to not "fire" her after L had already given notice of withdrawal)
* Post withdrawal, inform client of withdrawal
* Post withdrawal, must return all client's property to client so she can continue w/ case... problematic here bc property is damaged and will prejudice her
I argued he had a duty to investigate the claim before filing both under aba and fed civ pro rules.SlowLearner wrote:I don't think much turns on which way you argued .... but i said withdrawal not justified
1.
I thought there was no real issue with meritless claim issue because she had real injuries and dress was damaged ... so reasonable evidence to believe claim was true.
2.
Communication while appearing reasonable did not suit client - she just did not respond to calls or emails but did respond to letters...
sittin_pretty wrote:My outline for B:
I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)
II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.
III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.
IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.
So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...MMCheung wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:My outline for B:
I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)
II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.
III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.
IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.
I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.
So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.
If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).
If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.
Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.
I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)
Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.
Yes.cal_pushed wrote:So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...MMCheung wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:My outline for B:
I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)
II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.
III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.
IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.
I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.
So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.
If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).
If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.
Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.
I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)
Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.
I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.cal_pushed wrote:So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...MMCheung wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:My outline for B:
I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)
II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.
III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.
IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.
I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.
So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.
If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).
If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.
Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.
I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)
Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
From my reading, the policy discussion in Hiram was about how when gov't acts as govt, it needs to only act within the boundaries set out for it by state implies that the ultra vires discussion related to when gov't acting as govt. I can dsfi Italy see your argument.cal_pushed wrote:I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.cal_pushed wrote:So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...MMCheung wrote:sittin_pretty wrote:My outline for B:
I. Immunity
A. Rule: If governmental as opposed to proprietary function, immunity applies.
Analysis: in cases involving profit-generating water pipes and ball parks, function was consequently proprietary, so no immunity. In contrast, here, water treatment plant wasn't just NOT a money-maker, it's a money-loser, instead functioning for health, safety, wellbeing of citizens. Different from profit-generating water system in other case.
Conclusion: therefore, governmental function and immunity.
B. Rule: also immunity if lack of ability to contract (I didn't call it ultra vires, but same thing).
1. Law: case law saying if no ability to contract, no liability. But there's a mix of authority in following the lead precedent; while the original state supreme court case (Lyros?) indicates there doesn't have to be valid contract for Q.M., appellate court decision with dissent seems to limit that rule by holding that that if there's a city charter limiting how contracts entered into, failure to comply means no liability (but dissent says, wait! Lyros! Q.M!)
2. Analysis: No formal contract here, & didn't comply with city charter, but does that mean city didn't have ABILITY to contract? Valid arguments in both directions
3. Conclusion: Court could rule either way on ability to contract b/c of above, but still, probably immunity under I.A. (governmental, not proprietary, function)
II. Elements of QM clearly set forth in 1-2-3-4 format in one of the cases. Pretty easy to apply and go through. As long as you start with the right elements. Just plop in the right facts. (benefit? slightly disputable since didn't get grant... but probably still benefit because could help with future contracts & lots and lots of value/work performed... and accepted... etc. <--- delivered in organized 1-2-3-4 fashion). Conclusion: 4 elements satisfied.
III. Damages: one of the cases had an explicit discussion on the many types of damages allowed, including how the lower court had erred by not allowing damages for such thing as overhead and expected profits... which the appeals courts said COULD be allowed along with actual damages. Stuck to paraphrasing and applying that case. Conclusion: Blanchard can get compensated for everything on the invoice and then some.
IV. Overall conclusion: oops, forgot to do one. Hopefully won't matter too much.
I was going to organize my analysis like you did, basically, suggesting that newest (and lower ranking) case was a departure from previous two cases. But instead, opted to shape analysis as third case refining the law.
So for immunity, what I did was organized my rule around whether the city was operating under its governmental function or proprietary function.
If the gov't is sitting in its proprietary function, then a breach of the charter does not immunize the city from suit that a private corporation or individual would be liable to in the same situation. (See lyros where ct determined city operating in proprietary function, charter not satisfied -this fact was noted in the dissent in Harim - and the city was still liable. Also second sc case where ct stated city operating in its proprietary function and did not satisfy charter - this fact again only noted in the dissent In Harim - and city was liable for an).
If the statethe government is sitting in its govt function, city needs to satisfy charter or contract void and actions of city cannot be basis for civil damages. (See harim where ct did not specifically say city was operating in gov't function but getting a right of way and reclaiming wetlands not usually commercial or profit producing, yet it is Seth that benefits Health and welfare of citizens, charter not satisfied, and not liable.
Went into policy reasons for this impt requirement for when city operating in gov't function. That is, can't have city improperly expanding own power not delegated to city.
I then noted to dissent. And said dissent is not supported by law. Even police co discarded vehicles case that appellant corp stated to in case where judge dissented supports the harim opinion (city was operating under govt function for police services, and likely satisfied charter of that was analyzed by the ct, and the city was liable)
Here, city was in govt function. And not satisfy charter. Therefore not liable.
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)cal_pushed wrote:MMCheung wrote:cal_pushed wrote:I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.sittin_pretty wrote:
So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
sittin_pretty wrote:Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)cal_pushed wrote:MMCheung wrote:cal_pushed wrote:I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.sittin_pretty wrote:
So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
Hopefully, we're all right
That sounds like a good strategy.sittin_pretty wrote:Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)cal_pushed wrote:MMCheung wrote:cal_pushed wrote:I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.sittin_pretty wrote:
So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
Hopefully, we're all right
ThirdCharm wrote:OMG...I am still physically and psychologically consumed by the bar exam.
Every night since Tuesday I wake up from sleep remembering and realizing that I analyzed the law incorrectly or I missed another important issue.
Stop this immediately. Even if it requires copious amounts of liquor.Snowboarder1588 wrote:ThirdCharm wrote:OMG...I am still physically and psychologically consumed by the bar exam.
Every night since Tuesday I wake up from sleep remembering and realizing that I analyzed the law incorrectly or I missed another important issue.
Hahaha...glad I'm not the only one going through this... I just hope I did well enough to never find out how I did on individual questions....
asdf123456 wrote:Yeah I was also caught off guard by how dissimilar the 2 immunity issues were, one of them didn't even use the word immunity. I was actually so caught off guard that I decided to attack it 3>2>1. Ended up having like 30m for Issue 1 of PTB so all I got out was a shotgun vomit of the ultra vires rule and wrote some garbage about some provisions in the charter are more material than other provisions in the charter. Didn't even have time for the governmental immunity thing, even though I starred it in the library.
But it sounds like it's gonna work out ok for you? Given that you just kinda ignored them and treated it as 2 separate doctrines.
Given how bad I fucked up issue 1, do you think a 60 is possible?
Also, what did everyone say about the guy who was being chased by dogs and trespassed over a fence and the landowner made him go back to the dogs. I can't fully remember the answer choices but I think one was Guy liable for trespass, neighbor liable for battery and neighbor liable for negligence or something. I can't remember the choices that well.
sittin_pretty wrote:Me, I was consciously quite aware that I was confused about how the two different immunity issues ((1) gov't v proprietary function + (2) ultra vires/authority to contract) related to each other. I couldn't, after a few minute of thinking about it and re-skimming the cases, decide if one was a prerequisite for the other, if it was either/or, both/and, or how exactly the two halves fit together. So I made the conscious decision not to waste much time trying to figure that out. I made a calculated gamble that if I just argued each issue separately without pinpointing exactly how they relate to each other, I'd get a decent enough score. (and I just finessed the connection with the "could also be immune if..." kind of bridge)cal_pushed wrote:MMCheung wrote:cal_pushed wrote:I said basically City can seek immunity by either showing they were acting in governmental capacity, barring that, that city officials acting ultra virus would also be a bar. But felt like if it was government function, no getting into ultra virus - because it's moot. If you're acting Persian to gov function, how can it be ultra virus (outside the scope), because if its outside the scope I figured then that means it's not government function.... because it's outside the scope. Idk. I'm sure there's more than one correct way to roll that thing out.MMCheung wrote:Yes.sittin_pretty wrote:
So, was it your interpretation that if acting proprietary ultra virus doesn't apply? I went opposit. Thought case said city will be treated the same as others, unless acted beyond the scope of their ability to contract (per charter) ...
It took me a while to decide how to do this PT. I habdm't encountered a past PT that wanted us to weave cases into a coherent rule... but thought that might be what they were wanting in this case?? That, or a discussion of how rule has evolved... though I decided for the former approach bc this the most recent case is still pretty old (2005 or sth?). I think you took the latter approach?
Hopefully, we're all right
I'm kind of stressing about this though. I'm just having a hard time accepting that this was really it...Lawless! wrote:armenianBEAUTY wrote:I agree w/ the need for "pushing" on this one. I felt like there weren't enough issues. The largest paragraph was all literally just L's attempts to communicate w/ C.cal_pushed wrote:What issues did people discuss for PR. Feel like I forced some. I went:
Attorney agreements
Contingency fees
Confidence
Competence
Diligence
Conflict
Concurrent conflict
Representation despite
Permissive withdrawal
Mandatory withdrawal
Anyway, my topics:
* I skipped fee agreement bc it said "valid agreement."
* Competence -- personal injury attorney doing slip & fall... no violation
* Keep client property safely -- dumbo stored clothes in his office closet... violation
* Duty not to obstruct access to evidence -- ruined clothes
* Duty to communicate
* Close relationship w/ opposing counsel
* Permissive withdrawal -- repugnant course of action
* Mandatory withdrawal -- possibly fraud using attorneys services
* (Non)duty to take cases (i.e. when C begged L to not "fire" her after L had already given notice of withdrawal)
* Post withdrawal, inform client of withdrawal
* Post withdrawal, must return all client's property to client so she can continue w/ case... problematic here bc property is damaged and will prejudice her
I argued the same. But there wasn't a lot of big issues. I did really have to stretch those facts to make some arguments. But I did miss duty to properly withdraw... Damn
sittin_pretty wrote:We should all meet back up here the weekend of May 12th and celebrate our passing scores and maybe even have a meet up in person at Big Sur this summer to celebrate!