How about PT2 sec 2 #9. Oh and can you tell me how to deal with diagramming when the change certain words PT2 sec 4 #21.

Thanks.
God Bless.

A and B are very close, but they treat different elements as sufficient and necessary.

In the stimulus, I know two things about this boy: 1) he pushed someone, injuring them, and 2) he knows the difference between right and wrong. From these, and qualified to say that if he intended the injury, I conclude that the child did something wrong. I don't know that pushing someone and knowing the difference between right and wrong is sufficient to allow me to say that, with the intent to injure, this child's actions were wrong. I need an answer choice that states that.

A says that understanding the difference between right and wrong is necessary to characterize an action as wrong - that's the opposite of what I'm looking for. I only know that this boys actions were wrong if he intended the injury, and I also know that he knows the difference between right and wrong. A lets me say that the boys actions MIGHT be wrong (since he did know the difference), but not that they were wrong if he intended injury, because A doesn't tell me that knowing the difference and causing injury are sufficient for me to say the action is wrong.

B, on the other hand, says that if you know the difference and intentionally harm someone, that's wrong. These two characteristics are sufficient to let me say it was wrong. I know the boy knows the difference because it tells me. My conclusion is qualified by saying if he knew he would hurt the boy, then it's wrong. B let's me bridge that gap between what I know and what I want to conclude, so it's justifying what I just said.

Thank you for your explanations.

However, I still don't understand why B is wrong. You noted that Franklin should get a metal and Penn shouldn't, which is what the Conclusion of the stimulus states.

Alright, so we have two different things going on here.

The first is that governments can only respond by regulating, and regulations INEVITABLY lead to increase in price (making it more expensive). So if the government gets involved, prices are going up. (Diagram: Gov't Responds -> Regulations -> Increase prices)

Second, we have some public criticism for child-care services, which are socially necessary, so the government is CERTAIN to respond.
(Diagram: Gov't Responds)

So, to get my answer, I'm going to combine these two arguments.

I know the government's going to respond to the criticism in the child-care realm, and the only way they can do so is by regulating, which increases prices. So I'm certain that prices of child-care services will increase. That's B.

For these ones, I'm just combining the ideas mentioned and coming up with my own conclusion.

A talks about quality, which I've never mentioned, so I can't be sure about it. C talks about advances, which again I haven't talked about. For D, I know that public criticism here played a role in getting the government to respond, but I don't know if that's a general rule. And E is the inverse of what I know - just because the government getting involved results in increased prices doesn't mean that the government not responding leads to no increase in price.



I'd go like this:
Spoken Lang Comp Efficient -> Every Poss Perm Understandable
Human Auditory Sys Imperfect Receptor ->NOT EPPU

I take the contrapositive of the second statement because I have NOT EPPU, which lines up with the necessary condition of the first statement, and end up with:
SLCE -> EPPU
EPPU -> NOT HASIR
And combine them to get
SLCE -> NOT HASIR
and
HASIR -> NOT SLCE

So if a spoken language is completely efficient, then the human auditory system isn't an imperfect receptor of sounds
or
If the human auditory system is an imperfect receptor of sounds, then a spoken language isn't completely efficient. Or answer choice E.

*** PT 65 LR QUESTION SPOILER ALERT ***

For PT 65 Section 1 #20, the flaw question: I was down to two answers on this one. My explanation of the flaw is that while we know that newspaper stories about scientific studies are generally about findings that sound dramatic, we cannot conclude this attribute to a certain occurrence that occurs more than another. The small studies are more frequently in newspapers than the large ones. Why this is, we do not know for certain. The argument concludes that the small studies must be more likely to have findings that sound dramatic.

I want to know if you agree with the following assessment: The flaw is that there could be a huge number of small studies and not very many large ones, in which case, this could show that the small studies are not more likely than the large ones to have dramatic sounding findings.

I understand that D confronts that issue. I was intrigued by B. It does not consider that these dramatic findings could be backed by strong evidence, which is not an attribute we are told of these small studies. It also seems as if the argument is not considering that small studies may be precluded in terms of ever having dramatic findings, as these require strong evidence. In retrospect, I suppose the word may is not strong enough to show what I want.

I would like your general thoughts on this problem. Thanks bp!

Sorry about this - disregard my last answer, as it was incorrect. I thought something was fishy as I was writing up the answer (and not reading it closely enough), but posted on my way out the door. That's always a mistake.

So an evaluation of the stimulus again.

First, an officer is eligible if and only if they have an exemplary record. Second, if they did something this year that exceeded reasonable expectations AND that thing saved a life, they should get a medal.

From this, I want to say that Franklin should get a medal and Penn should not.

The problem here is the Penn should not part - in order for me to conclude that someone shouldn't get a medal, I have to know that they don't have an exemplary record. My second rule concerning the giving out of medals is that if they meet the two criteria, they should get a medal. That will never help me determine whether someone should not get a medal. The only rule that tells me whether someone should NOT get a medal is if they don't have an exemplary record.

So if I want to justify the conclusion that Franklin should get a medal, I need to say that he saved a life while acting beyond reasonably expectations and he also has an exemplary record. To justify that Penn should NOT get a medal, I need to know he doesn't have an exemplary record. A tells me that.

B, on the other hand, justifies Franklin getting that medal (he has an exemplary record, saved someone, and acted above the reasonable expectations). However, it doesn't justify Penn not getting a medal. I know he didn't qualify for a medal by going outside the reasonable expectations of duty, but that's just one sufficient condition to get the medal, not the only one. With B, I haven't justified Penn not getting a medal, just saying that he doesn't qualify under the one rule that I know; there could be another.

So B only lets me justify Franklin getting the medal, not Penn not getting the medal. So it's not right.

Sorry for the confusion the first time around!

got it now, thank you! I have been refreshing this page anxiously while racking my brain trying to figure it out myself.

Yes. This is how I would say the flaw, though I would phrase it a little different at the end:
There could be a huge number of small, observational studies and not very many large ones, in which case there are more stories about the small, observational studies because there are more of them to write about, and thus more that possibly have dramatic findings to warrant being written about.

In short, the small stories might flood the world, in which case of course they're going to be written about more.

Or, just because a certain thing shares two features (newspaper stories being the thing, and they share the features of being about small studies and about studies that have dramatic findings) doesn't mean that those two features are commonly together.

D deals with that directly, so that's my answer.

As to B, my conclusion doesn't care about whether the scientific evidence is strong or weak. That's a complete red herring in the argument that doesn't play any role whatsoever in getting to my conclusion. As such, it can't play into the flaw that the argument is making. The argument looks like this:
Stories about small studies show up more frequently.
Stories are generally only written about studies that have dramatic findings.
Therefore, small studies are more likely to have dramatic findings.
I don't lose anything in the argument by ignoring the scientific strength of the argument; if it doesn't play a role in the argument, it can't be a flaw

Checking out early tonight because we're hosting our Google+ Hangout with me. So stop by our Google+ page if you want to hear answers to pressing LSAT questions, or just put a low-definition face to my posts.

I'll check in after to see if anyone had any last minute questions.

Could you please explain how #18 Section 3 on PT 36 is the right answer? I don't see it at all. Thanks!

Hey BP! I have a couple ofquestions for you. Test #65, Dec '11. (EDIT - holy cow, someone else had the same problem on question 20 I did! LOL!)

First Logic section:

Q25 - Interior decorator discussing well-designed public places, artwork, uncomfortableness and a bunch of other hooey that made me go wha???? I didn't even know where to start

Thanks BP Shinners!

How come the stimuli that talk about happiness are always filled with gobbledegook that makes them difficult to understand? And why is 'gobbledegook' a word that spell-check accepts?

Alright, let's talk about the stimulus:
We've got two viewpoints here. The first one (which, as we know, is something with which the author is going to take issue) is:
People should be accepting of who they are (and, thus, shouldn't be dissatisfied with themselves).

Alright, good for those people who are happy with who they are.

The Author, however, says that this is garbage - if we want a society with happy people, this is a bad principle (and, thus, people shouldn't be accepting of who they are).

What proof does he offer for this? His proof is that no one can be genuinely happy if they are not trying to make themselves better. So, in short, trying to make yourself better is necessary to happiness.

I need to find a flaw in this argument, because if it doesn't make an assumption, what the heck is it doing on the LSAT? So let's think about it for a second.

I know the author thinks the principle is bad - in other words, the author doesn't think people should accept who they are. Why does he think this? Because they can't be happy unless they're trying to better themselves, and we want people to be happy.

Now let's connect those two ideas and see if there's a disconnect - can people both accept who they are AND also attempt to better themselves? If they can, then the author has a problem; if they can't, then the author's argument is fine.

The stimulus never tells us that you can't both accept yourself and try to make yourself better (and neither does common sense - heck, I LOVE myself, but I still do Insanity every day). In order for my conclusion to follow (that the principle is bad, i.e. I shouldn't accept myself), I have to assume that I can't both accept myself and try to better myself, because if that's the case, I won't be happy, and the author tells me that's bad.

So, in short, I'm looking for an answer that talks about acceptance of yourself not allowing you to try to better yourself..

The only answer that does that is answer choice B, so I don't really have to think any more about it. But let's look at it anyway.

B says that if you're not dissatisfied with yourself (i.e. you accept yourself), then you're less likely to pursue personal excellence (i.e. better yourself). It's not exactly what I was looking for - I wanted something that said if you accept yourself you won't try to better yourself. However, what I was looking for was essentially that these two things don't overlap. B tells me that those who accept themselves are less likely to better themselves than others. In order to say that those who accept themselves WON'T better themselves, I have to believe that they're less likely than others to try to better themselves. In short, since I want to say they have 0 incentive, I have to believe that they have less incentive, since 0 is as low as you can go.

(The other world that's possible is that no one wants to better themselves, in which case again the author's argument falls apart. And again, B plays into this by telling me that someone out there is more likely to want to better themselves - if you're more likely than someone else, you're above 0% likely)

And one more look for thoroughness's sake - let's negate it: People who are not dissatisfied with themselves are more likely than others to pursue personal excellence. If those who accept themselves are MORE likely than others to try to better themselves, the author's argument dies on the vine; bingo.

This is one of those diagrammable, quantified MBT questions that really relies on your ability to combine quantified statements.

So let's look at it (first instance of a term written out; future instances just the caps used in the first instance):

Coffee House -> Public Place
Restaurants -> Public Place

(make sure you don't do this as a conjunctive and - I don't need to be both to be a public place)

PP AND Well Designed -m-> Artwork

PP AND ~Comfortable -> ~WD
PP AND C -> Spacious Interior

At this point, I notice that PP is always sufficient, and I know that CH and R are PP, so I'm going to drop that out of the equation. So I have

WD -m-> A
~C -> ~WD
C -> SI

This is what I'm working with. First, I notice that the second statement shares a term with both other statements; however, they're on the wrong side of the arrow and negated. Contrapositive time.

1) WD -m-> A
2) WD -> C
3) C -> SI
__________ (i.e. time to combine)
1+2) Combining quantified terms can be tricky. Some rules of thumb: the Shared term always has to be in the Sufficient condition of the Stronger statement, and you end up with a Some* statement. So here, I've got the Shared term (WD) in the Sufficient condition (of both here) of my Stronger statement (the All statement, i.e. 2). So I get:
A -s- C
(Notice I didn't use an arrow - some statements are reversible; i.e. they don't have sufficient and necessary conditions, it's just telling me these two groups overlap)

2+3) WD -> SI
(pretty straightforward)

I can't combine 1 and 3, and I can't combine any of my combinations with another statement from the stimulus, so I'm done.

In short, I'm looking for:
A -s- C
or
WD -> SI

D gives me the latter (WD -> SI; it still talks about coffeehouses, but I know they're just a public place, and I'm always talking about public places).

*Three exceptions:
1 and 2)You can never combine two some or a some and a most.
3) If the two statements are a Most and an All statement, and the Sufficient condition of the All statement lines up with the Necessary condition of the Most statement, you end up with a Most statement. All of the other requirements apply (Shared the Sufficient of the Stronger), but you end up with a Most instead of a Some.

I have 2 questions for you when you open shop tomorrow.

1.) PT64 RC Q19
Please explain why B is wrong and C is right.

2.) PT64 LR2 Q22
I think I understand why C is right, but I would like to hear what your reasoning is.

Thanks in advance

PS: The answer you gave me to my last question helped me be able to discern the right answer on a similar question on PT64 (LR2 #18)

Opening shop early today to make up for the early close on Tuesday.

Thunderbirds are go!

Second time I've been asked this in 12 hours!

Alright, so first we're going to look at the question, as that trips people up.

This is essentially a Logical Reasoning Flaw question, asking you to hop inside B's head and point out a/the flaw that underlies A's argument. Why am I saying that it has to underlie A's argument? Because on the LSAT, when it tells me that two things are alike (and it's not asking me to question that comparison), I treat them as alike in all relevant factors. Here, it tells me to consider arguments like A's argument - since it's telling me to do that, then I have to consider an argument like A's argument to be an argument that mirrors A's argument in all relevant factors. A flaw/assumption underlying an argument is certainly relevant. So if you see another question like this on RC, then just drop the 'like' and consider it to be talking about Passage A.

So we've got the question down - have B point out the/a flaw in A's argument.

Let's look at B first and see why it's wrong.

B is unbelievably strong - ANY action was NECESSARILY orchestrated. That's a tall order. Does A back up that ANY action was orchestrated by the genes for self-propagation? I'd have to say no to this question. I know that evo. psych. has taught me to examine a given human activity through the lens of successful reproduction, but that doesn't translate to being able to always find an answer to the question of how that behavior helps reproductive success. If I'm going to back up a statement like 'any action', I need the author to use language explicitly as strong. Since A doesn't make a statement that strong, then answer choice B can't be describing a flaw in A's argument. Since I need my answer to both be a part of A's argument AND something B would regard as a flaw, it can't be right.

Meta point - be wary of strong language on RC answer choices. These are academic papers, and academics are famously wishy-washy, even when they believe something 100%.

C, on the other hand, seems to be the point of contention. A argues that we can view these actions (altruistic ones) as a means of enhancing evolutionary success. From this, he concludes that we should look at it this way, and it explains it well. B thinks this is hogwash. So A definitely does assume that if something can be explained in evolutionary terms, it should be and the explanation is a good one. B, on the other hand, thinks that's a bad way to argue (and I'd agree).



First off, a logical force analysis of the stimulus. I have a bunch of wishy-washy language (typically selected, almost never, guided by). When I've got soft language like that, I'm looking for a weaker answer choice. On top of that, these Soft Must Be True questions (most strongly supported, best illustrated, etc...) inherently want a weaker answer choice. Since I'm doubling up on that, I will throw out answer choice B and E definitely (I give them a read after seeing they're strong - B has an any, E has The only, and nothing in them makes me feel like I have enough power to support them) and D probably (it has a most in there, which is stronger than I want; I might be able to back it up with an almost never and a typically; however, I read it and see that it says most problems being solved are problems that politicians and business leaders want solved, and I only know that typically they're selected by scientists, so that's out).

So I've got A and C left.

A tells me when scientists are going to be called on to solve a problem. I know who sometimes calls on them to solve a problem, but I don't know when or why. So A is giving me an explanation for something I know, but an explanation usually isn't the answer to an implication family question (unless it's the only possible explanation, like if you're told that a car company sold the same amount of cars but decreased its market share - then, the other companies MUST HAVE sold more cars, no way around it). Here, however, it's just explaining the rate of asking them to solve it, which isn't necessary to my argument and certainly isn't backed up by information that they're called upon to solve stuff at time.

So I've got C by process of elimination. However, I'm going to attack it from the other end and see how we could guess at C before going to the answer choices.

By a wide margin, the strongest statement in the stimulus is the first one - the public FALSELY believes that scientists can solve any problem. The language in the other sentences is weaker, as noted above. This, however, is an absolute statement of judgment made by the author about the success rates of scientists. It's strong, and when I have a statement that is stronger than the rest of the stimulus in a soft must be true question, I know it's going to play into the answer choice. It's either going to stand on its own and give me the answer, or use the rest of the stimulus in an indirect way.

Here, I'm expecting it to use the rest in an indirect way. Why don't I expect it to give me the answer by itself? Because it's not really comparative (something is the most effective, or the surest way, etc..., which is a huge key that I'm going to just need to use it for the answer, or at least mostly just use it), it's not a rule (if you see a diagrammable rule in a soft Must Be True, it's probably, by itself, going to apply to an answer), and if I tried to come up with another statement based off of it, all I'd get is, "Scientists are sometimes unable to solve a problem." Well, that has to be true, but it's so obvious that I don't expect it to be an answer. Those rules and comparisons, on the other hand, let me say a any number of things in other situations, because I can apply the general rule to any situation, or I can compare anything else to the most efficient way and find it wanting.

So now I think for a second - scientists aren't gods, according to this guy, and they have some problems they can't solve. However, they seem to be doing a good job of fooling others when they get to pick the problems they solve. If I put those two ideas together, I would say something like, "Scientists wouldn't seem so great if they weren't allowed to pick which problems they were solving." That's what C says, so that's my answer.


[/quote]

Awesome!

Thank you, sir. It makes complete sense now. I guess I just didn't understand the stimulus enough when I was reading it. I hate when that happens, sometimes I'll read a stimulus and have no idea what I just read.

Hey BP
Would you please explain PT7 Sec4 #19? Oh and I took your advice for the MBT and SMBT and so far its going good.

Thanks
God bless

Ah, the Leap Year question. The format of this question is a bit dated, but it's definitely still relevant as I would say it's very similar to a parallel/soft must be true principle question.

At the beginning, I'm pretty much told how the world works now. I don't care too much about that because we have a new proposal.

The new proposal states that I'm going to have the exact same calendar, only there will be a day every year (December 31) and another day every 4th year (Feb. 28, perhaps?) that just won't be a part of the week. We could make it a holiday where everyone gets off and call it Blurnsday, and we'd all have a Blurnsday parade while eating Blurns Dogs and playing Blurnsball.

Whatever the case, what I know is that every date on the calendar will still exist, but now it will always fall on the same day. Get married on a Sunday? Your anniversary will always be a Sunday. Born on a Tuesday? Celebrate it each year on a Tuesday.

So, in short, anything that relates to a specific date or day of the week will still be fine. They'll still exist, the weeks will still exist, and I'll still have a stable (in fact, a more stable) calendar. There will just be a day or two every year that is a bit outside of the normal flow of the week.

A - So people with birthdays/anniversaries on Dec. 30 or 31 still know when their events are happening, and now they always know what day it will fall on. This proposal will help them, not create scheduling conflicts.

C - I still have the same number of days every year, so schools requiring a certain number (even if it's 365) won't have any scheduling conflicts.

D - Great! I can still have my 3 day holiday, because the calendar is only changing on two dates, so those three day holidays are still 3 day holidays. No problem there - this is relying on the structure of the week, which is almost not affected at all.

E - Again, now not only do I know the date, but I can know what day it is without looking at a calendar or doing weird math (June 8, today, is a Friday - it'll be the same next year, and the year after that, etc...). The new proposal helps them.

B - Ah, here's a problem. This isn't related to a specific date or day of the week, but I'm counting the number of days between observance. When those non-days-of-the-week days come around, they're going to mess with my math. For instance, let's assume you're a member of a Christian religion that must celebrate Mass every seventh day. This year, you're in good shape, because every seventh day is Sunday. You don't have to take off work to go to Mass.

However, let's say that December 28th is a Sunday. You celebrate Mass. Then, the 29th is Monday (day 1), 30st is Tuesday (day 2), 31st is Blurnsday (day 3), Jan. 1st is Wednesday (day 4), 2nd is Thursday (day 5), 3rd is Friday (day 6), and 4th is Saturday (day 7). On Saturday, the 4th, you celebrated Mass, and for the rest of the year, you do so on Saturday. Different, but still no problem. Then, the next year rolls around, and your seventh day is again one day of the week earlier. Now, you're celebrating on Friday. That extra day of the week throws your count off, and now you have a problem - you're taking every Friday off to go to Mass. That's a scheduling nightmare.

Now, that's a long explanation, and something that I wouldn't want to have to go through while taking the exam. So how do I get there faster?

Whenever I'm introducing a change, I want to think about what has changed. Have any dates changed? Nope - still have Jan 1-Dec 31. Have the days of the week changed? Nope, I have an extra, non-day, but the others are still there, and the week is still intact. The only thing that has changed is that 1/2 week every year where I have an extra day somewhere between Sunday and next Saturday. With that extra day, anything that counts days is going to be off. B is the only one that counts days, so that's my answer.

Thanks, BP.

I have a hard time with "most strongly supports" type questions, and looking back over questions like these, I realize how much easier they are if you look for soft language.

Could you please explain PT 38 Section 4 # 25 please, it makes no sense at ALL to me. Thanks in advance!

Look for strong language in the stimulus, look for weak language in the answer choices.

So this is a weird way of phrasing a Must Be False question, but when something isn't compatible with what's listed above, it must be false.

Stimulus:
One reason European music is so sophisticated/has been influential is that it isn't defined by what it's used for. So religious music can be listened to outside of a religious setting, and dance music can be listened to outside of a club. Think Christmas songs on the radio or that guy who's blasting the newest Gaga CD while riding down the highway - the music is outside of its original context, but it's still good.

I don't have a good prediction for what I'm looking for, so answer choice time.

Answer choices:
A - I'm told that European music has had a strong influence throughout the world. It's completely possible that African music has had an even stronger influence. Without a statement in the stimulus comparing European music to African music, or without an absolute comparative statement ("most influential"), I don't know what the relative influence of these two continental music styles have had. As such, this could be true, for all I know.
B - The stimulus tells me one reason is that it became abstracted from the original context. Another reason could quite easily be the economic/military expansion. For all I know, this could be true.
C - I know nothing about Chinese music. If I know nothing about it, anything is possible. Just like answer choice C.
D - Now, I have a problem. I know that European music is considered a sophisticated achievement because it can be understood outside of its original context. D tells me that music that CANNOT be understood outside of its original context is THE MOST SOPHISTICATED. If being understood outside of its context makes music a sophisticated achievement, music that lacks that feature can't be even more sophisticated. Here's my answer.
E - "Some works of art" is such a weak statement that it almost can't help itself but be true. On top of that, it says that some works lose their appeal outside of their context. Since I know that work that doesn't lose that appeal outside of the context is sophisticated, there must be some works that do lose that appeal - otherwise, my statement would be meaningless, since it applies to everything.

How about Pt10 Sec 4 #16. What would you consider to be the strongest statement that should help me to get to the AC?

Thanks
God bless

I wouldn't consider there to be a strong statement here that leads to the AC - that's a good general thing to look out for, but there won't always be one.

When I don't have that strong statement, I'm looking either for something that sums up the entire argument, or something that fills in a piece of information I'm not told but can definitely infer. In this case, I'm talking about scientists arguing over water running slowly to form a channel, and water running quickly to form a channel. The important thing here is that I'm told that there are signs that the channels were formed quickly; I'm not told, conversely, that there's any evidence that the channels formed slowly. However, to be able to tell how quickly the channels formed, I have to be able to distinguish between ones formed slowly and quickly. I know I can tell the difference, so water must affect rock/channels differently based on the speed with which it forms them. That's D.

This is almost a necessary assumption question, and honestly I would expect it to show up on the modern LSAT as a necessary assumption instead of a MBT; however, I would expect it to cut out that line about there being physical evidence, and have that sentence just start with, "The flood theory was initially...".