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Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

Just Asahi it.

MarcusAurelius wrote:Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

Where are you getting this problem from? For what purpose are you asking?

Tom Joad wrote:Just Asahi it.

Don't forget Nicastro.

ph14 wrote:

Tom Joad wrote:Just Asahi it.

Don't forget Nicastro.

And Goodyear. You will be fine. Also, if your prof is a real stickler there hasn't been a total majority opinion on stream of commerce jurisdiction since VWW. Also, don't cheat.

Tom Joad wrote:Just Asahi it.

Nah, asahi is so 1980s. Gotta get that Nicastro. Not that it makes a huge difference.

This is a question from one of his past exams. Not cheating.

I'm curious as to whether the south carolina court can assert jurisdiction in this case. In most of the cases I've seen, the plaintiff is attempting to bring suit in the forum where the cause of action arose, e.g. Assahi, Nicastro, World-Wide.

In this case the cause of action didn't arise in south carolina, so would the court be asserting general jurisdiction? Or is there an argument for specific jurisdiction as well?

General. Trying to argue they have "continuous and systematic" ties to SC.

MarcusAurelius wrote:In this case the cause of action didn't arise in south carolina, so would the court be asserting general jurisdiction? Or is there an argument for specific jurisdiction as well?

You should argue both, even if it is merely to bring one of them up and then dismiss it in a single sentence. It's hard to give you an answer that's helpful without knowing how much you've covered in Civ Pro so far.

ph14 wrote:

MarcusAurelius wrote:Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

Where are you getting this problem from? For what purpose are you asking?

Seems like there is personal jurisdiction. OA has its principal place of business in South Carolina and is incorporated there, so there is definitely personal jurisdiction (general jurisdiction there).
DDM seems like there's a argument for general jurisdiction, since it operates a plant there. I think you'd have to look at Helicopteros and how systemic and continuous the contacts are. But it seems like the contacts are systemic and continuous, although you should also the other side (i.e., Helicopteros said you had to basically be at home in this jurisdiction, and they are at home in France). There is also a plausible argument for specific jurisdiction, because it manufactures parts for the Elecante in South Carolina, ships it to France for assembly, then sells it to OA in South Carolina. You could argue that this crash thus "arises out of" DDM's contacts with South Carolina.

Also, did they serve DDM in South Carolina? Then there would be PJ as well. Although i'm not sure if you have to serve a corporation at its headquarters.

ph14 wrote:

ph14 wrote:

MarcusAurelius wrote:Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

Where are you getting this problem from? For what purpose are you asking?

Seems like there is personal jurisdiction. OA has its principal place of business in South Carolina and is incorporated there, so there is definitely personal jurisdiction (general jurisdiction there).
DDM seems like there's a argument for general jurisdiction, since it operates a plant there. I think you'd have to look at Helicopteros and how systemic and continuous the contacts are. But it seems like the contacts are systemic and continuous, although you should also the other side (i.e., Helicopteros said you had to basically be at home in this jurisdiction, and they are at home in France). There is also a plausible argument for specific jurisdiction, because it manufactures parts for the Elecante in South Carolina, ships it to France for assembly, then sells it to OA in South Carolina. You could argue that this crash thus "arises out of" DDM's contacts with South Carolina.

Also, did they serve DDM in South Carolina? Then there would be PJ as well. Although i'm not sure if you have to serve a corporation at its headquarters.

Thats a good point. A corporation can be served in any way the state law provides, or by serving process on an officer of the corporation, or (if foreign entity) by internationally agreed means

So I could also argue that if service of process was made against a DDM corporate officer at the plant in SC, then there would be personal jurisdiction

I appreciate everyone's responses

MarcusAurelius wrote:

ph14 wrote:

ph14 wrote:

MarcusAurelius wrote:Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

Where are you getting this problem from? For what purpose are you asking?

Seems like there is personal jurisdiction. OA has its principal place of business in South Carolina and is incorporated there, so there is definitely personal jurisdiction (general jurisdiction there).
DDM seems like there's a argument for general jurisdiction, since it operates a plant there. I think you'd have to look at Helicopteros and how systemic and continuous the contacts are. But it seems like the contacts are systemic and continuous, although you should also the other side (i.e., Helicopteros said you had to basically be at home in this jurisdiction, and they are at home in France). There is also a plausible argument for specific jurisdiction, because it manufactures parts for the Elecante in South Carolina, ships it to France for assembly, then sells it to OA in South Carolina. You could argue that this crash thus "arises out of" DDM's contacts with South Carolina.

Also, did they serve DDM in South Carolina? Then there would be PJ as well. Although i'm not sure if you have to serve a corporation at its headquarters.

Thats a good point. A corporation can be served in any way the state law provides, or by serving process on an officer of the corporation, or (if foreign entity) by internationally agreed means

So I could also argue that if service of process was made against a DDM corporate officer at the plant in SC, then there would be personal jurisdiction

Yeah, argue both sides and include (briefly) stuff like that, shows that you are thinking creatively. But there is nothing in the fact pattern either way really so don't spend much time on that. Don't forget to discuss the long arm statute as well.

Since the long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limit, I would need to mention that the facts of this case are within reach of the statute so long as assertion of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements. So the minimum contacts test and the long-arm inquiry are collapsed into one. Would I need to elaborate any further than that?

MarcusAurelius wrote:Since the long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limit, I would need to mention that the facts of this case are within reach of the statute so long as assertion of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements. So the minimum contacts test and the long-arm inquiry are collapsed into one. Would I need to elaborate any further than that?

Don't think so, that sounds perfect.

MarcusAurelius wrote:Since the long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limit, I would need to mention that the facts of this case are within reach of the statute so long as assertion of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements. So the minimum contacts test and the long-arm inquiry are collapsed into one. Would I need to elaborate any further than that?

I agree with ph14 that this sounds fine, but my prof would have given points for analysis of the long arm itself (the part where it isn't stretched to the constitutional limit). Depends on your prof.

bk187 wrote:

MarcusAurelius wrote:Since the long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limit, I would need to mention that the facts of this case are within reach of the statute so long as assertion of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements. So the minimum contacts test and the long-arm inquiry are collapsed into one. Would I need to elaborate any further than that?

I agree with ph14 that this sounds fine, but my prof would have given points for analysis of the long arm itself (the part where it isn't stretched to the constitutional limit). Depends on your prof.

Good point, a lot of this depends on what your professor wants.

How would you assess the "fair play and substantial justice"/reasonableness prong?

Defendant is a foreign corporation, unique burdens are placed on one who must defend himself in a foreign legal system. However, like ph14 mentioned, they do have a plant in the forum so the court probably wouldn't place significant weight on this factor.

I am a little unsure about the forum state's interest in adjudicating this dispute though..

The claim is between two parties, neither of which are South Carolina citizens. So this factor may not weigh in very high either.

The state does have an interest in protecting consumers from unsafe products, but they can have this deterrent effect so long as the state has jurisdiction over OA, who distributes DDM's products.

When I have done practice fairness factors questions I have just made a list of parties' interests, forum interests, and international judicial system interests and ran through the different types as best as I could.

MarcusAurelius wrote:Desert Dragon Motors (DDM) is a French corporation that designs and manufactures the Elecante, a luxury hybrid gas/electric automobile. Each car sells for upwards of $300,000.

DDM manufactures all of its cars in Rhone, France, and sells fewer than 1,000 cars globally per year. Over half of all the units sold are sold in the United States. DDM does not sell its cars directly to consumers, nor does it directly advertise in the United States. All DDM cars sold in the United States are sold through a distributor, Olive Autos (OA), a completely separate entity from DDM. OA is a South Carolina Corporation, with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. OA advertises DDM’s cars nationally and sells the cars through regional retail stores. OA has retail stores in six states, including New Jersey. Each retail store typically sells fewer than 100 cars per year.

In 2009, DDM opened a manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina to fabricate the transmission for the Elecante. The parts are sent back to France for assembly in the car. Some of the transmissions are sold to other car manufacturers and parts suppliers. By 2010, the plant in Greenville, employed approximately 1,000 full-time employees, approximately 35% of DDM’s workforce.

In April 2011, Jennifer Penny, a New Jersey resident, bought an Elecante from the OA retail store in Cherry Hill, NJ. In July, Penny was driving through the Cherry Hill Mall parking lot, when another driver rear-ended her. Although neither car was traveling more than fifteen (15) miles per hour, Penny’s car exploded, causing severe injuries to her. On July 1, 2011, Penny sued DDM and OA in federal district court in South Carolina, alleging that her injuries were caused by manufacturing and/or design defects in the car.

DDM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it under FRCP 12(b)(2). You are a clerk for the federal judge hearing the case. Please advise her how she should rule on defendant’s motion. Assume for the purpose of this motion that the South Carolina Long Arm statute extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the constitution, and that all of Penny’s claims are based on state law.


Thoughts?

I will start of by saying I am a 1L with barely 1 month of law school under his belt so this might be completely wrong, but I figured it would be a good experience for me to try it out anyway.

I would start off by just saying diversity of citizenship is fulfilled under section 1332 because Plaintiff- NJ Citizen, DDM- Foreign, and OA-SC, and the claims is most likely worth way more then $75,000(might not be needed in your answer, but my teacher really seems to always ask why it was brought into Fed Court, and under what statute.)

OA is bound its a citizen of SC under some subsection of 1332. DDM I think can get it dismissed.

I'm a moron and I didn't notice yall already discussed Helicorp before I typed this all out, but i will leave it in here for references if/when people search.

Based on my understanding I would say this is brought in terms of General jurisdiction, I had trouble grasping where the boundary was, and the clearest way to explain it for me was in order for general jurisdiction to seem fair it would have seem ok for a citizen of Tokyo to bring a suit in SC about an accident that occurred in Taiwan due to a faulty part in this car. I don't feel like this case is strong enough to bring suit in SC under general. I also don't feel it is strong enough to bring under specific, in our class we had this case named Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia S.A. (Helicop) v. Hall its a SCOTUS case from the mid 80's.

The jist of this suit is Helicop. was contracted out to a texas based oil company to move personnel materials and equipment into West Peru because they were constructing a pipeline well one day 1 of the helicopters crashed and killed everyone on board. Family members of the deceased brought a wrongful death suit in texas state court alleging General jurisdiction. Helicop had bought 80% of their fleet in fort worth, trained most of their pilots and mechanics at fort worth, and often negotiated contracts in Texas, however, they had no offices in texas and they were Colombian organiztion who typically did their business in South America. Helicorp brought a 12-b-2 motion and here is how it played out:
Trial Court- Yes there is jurisdiction. Plaintiffs awarded over a mill.
Appellate court- No there is not. Remanded.
Supreme Court of Texas- yes there is because our long arm statute goes all the way the constitution allows us too. Reinstated trial decision.

It gets to Scotus and they have a split decision, not sure the number exactly, but they decide there is not jurisdiction.

The opinions in these cases are a little weird so I will start with the dissent by Brennan- He argues that although this was never argued before it should of been brought under specific jurisdiction. Because the claim while it may not "arise out of" there activity in Texas it definitely is directly related too (The contract was negotiated in Texas, Helicopter was bought in Fort Worth, the pilot who the plaintiff's claim pilot error caused the crash was trained in Forth Worth.)

Blackmun writes the majority, he pretty much says they don't do enough business in Texas for general. He cites a case Rosenberg Bros & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. SCOTUS from 1923 which says that just buying stuff is not enough in state is not enough to be continuous and systematic. He also kind of rebutts Brennan by saying that the cause of action must specifically "arise out of the" business dealing of a corporation in a state.

Ok now that we took that huge ass detour back to my point. In this case, The car blew up in NJ from being rear ended, and the only presence by DDM was a transmission manufacturing factory. Now I don't know a ton about cars, but that sounds like the good ole Ford Pinta 1970's controversy issue with the gas tank being blown up when it was hit from behind due to a bad defect. You must certainly cannot argue under Blackmun that the defect "arose out of the" transmission manufacturing in SC so it gets bounced. Perhaps there is an argument under Brennan's "directly related to," but I don't see it. So I say it gets bounced for not meeting the sovergnity branch of the test that was established by Burger king and based on International Shoe

As for as the case of "fair play and substantial justice" its kind of a balancing act between all parties involved and if it would be fair for all parties involved(Plaintiff, Defendants, State the action is brought, and court in question.) As far as I know if you make it to this branch of the BK test after fulfilling the sovereignty branch you really can't be wrong since its never been established how to balance them correctly. In this case I would say it is with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for this trial to be held in SC:

Plaintiff- She brought the action here, so she has already shown that the venue is agreeable to her.
Defendant OA- They are a SC citizen so no issue.
Defendant DDM- They could argue it would be wrong to submit themselves to a foreign court (Asahi), however, they have a factory here so the court will most likely say its fair for them to be here since they have already gained some benefits of being in SC.
State- They can make the argument of trying to protect SC citizens from a foreign company who makes unsafe cars.
Court- They would have a split decision. All the evidence is in NJ. So they could argue that it should not be tried in SC for efficiency purposes.

So you have the Plaintiff, Defendants, and State on 1 side, and maybe the court on the other side, and you just decide which is most important and write a conclusion saying why, and that's Fair play and substantial justice, as far as I understand it.

As far as Nicastro goes we have 3 opinions discussing minimum contacts/purposeful availment. I am going to do them real quick.
Ginsburg: Yes, extreme string of commerce idea just being an international company they should reasonably expect their cars to end up in the US, and should have to answer for any issues that occur.
Breyer- Maybe, his is a little bit smaller idea of string of commerce, depends if they sell enough quantity of the good in country.
Kennedy- I would say no just because they did not actually sell any product themselves in the state it was just a factor of production.

hey! i think another route that hasn't been discussed yet is quasi in rem jurisdiction (seizing the assets of the physical plant in south carolina to satisfy the tort claim). although shaffer v. heitner still required the minimum contacts test when the property was intangible property, i think the presence of physical property allows you to get out of the whole messy framework initiated by international shoe and go back to a simple test of physical presence like pennoyer (where the court says that seizure of the physical property within the state would be sufficient notice for proceedings in rem and that states should be able to do this in the interest of providing their citizens adequate relief). the fact that minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not required where there is physical presence is supported by cases like burnham (where the physical presence of a person and personal service while they were in the state was enough to grant in personam jurisdiction).

k5220 wrote:hey! i think another route that hasn't been discussed yet is quasi in rem jurisdiction (seizing the assets of the physical plant in south carolina to satisfy the tort claim). although shaffer v. heitner still required the minimum contacts test when the property was intangible property, i think the presence of physical property allows you to get out of the whole messy framework initiated by international shoe and go back to a simple test of physical presence like pennoyer (where the court says that seizure of the physical property within the state would be sufficient notice for proceedings in rem and that states should be able to do this in the interest of providing their citizens adequate relief). the fact that minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not required where there is physical presence is supported by cases like burnham (where the physical presence of a person and personal service while they were in the state was enough to grant in personam jurisdiction).

You make a good point bringing up quasi in rem, but I don't think your statement of the rule in Shaffer is 100% accurate.

There are two types of quasi in rem proceedings:
quasi in rem type I - the court seeks to determine the rights of the named parties to the attached property
quasi in rem type II - the actual subject of the dispute is something other than the property itself

Shaffer applied to all quasi in rem type II proceedings, The only time having physical power over the property satisfies minimum contacts is if the cause of action and the property are logically related. (In Shaffer, the Officers' directorships were not logically related to their ownership of Greyhound stock)

With that said, Had Penny attached DDM's manufacturing plant in South Carolina to establish jurisdiction there (quasi in rem type II), you'd need to look for a nexus between the defendant, the forum, and the property attached.