1L Substantive Law Questions (Get your BLL on ITT) Forum

[Swimp]

I'm starting to question whether my above answer to AllDangle is correct at all, or if it would be permissible to 'tag' the defendant in NC while he's at the courthouse for the first claim. That seems awfully unfair, and I could have sworn I remember my professor saying something about being in court not qualifying a person for general jurisdiction, but I don't know if that extended to the 'tag, you're it' rule as well and can't find it in my outline or notes. Ugh, all that typing only to tell you that you may not want to waste your time on it.

I can't cite a rule to back this up, but I don't think you can get someone into court based on specific personal jurisdiction, and then claim to have general personal jurisdiction over them. If you could do that, specific jurisdiction wouldn't exist.

Not to mention, depending on the state, the tort claim might have to independently satisfy the minimum amount in controversy, which is $75K for diversity jurisdiction. That would have to be a pretty serious car accident.

[kay2016]

I'm starting to question whether my above answer to AllDangle is correct at all, or if it would be permissible to 'tag' the defendant in NC while he's at the courthouse for the first claim. That seems awfully unfair, and I could have sworn I remember my professor saying something about being in court not qualifying a person for general jurisdiction, but I don't know if that extended to the 'tag, you're it' rule as well and can't find it in my outline or notes. Ugh, all that typing only to tell you that you may not want to waste your time on it.

If someone is going to court to contest personal jurisdiction they can make a "special appearance" and can't be tagged while they're at the courthouse. Maybe that's what you're thinking about?

General jurisdiction is basically only where you're domiciled.. pj for other issues is proper if you're tagged or satisfy minimum contacts/reaching out for the topic of the suit.

Hope that helps a little, we only talked about things generally, we didn't talk about joinder andstuff

[MCFC]

So here's a hypo from an old exam that I don't think is difficult, but I feel like I'm missing something obvious.

Someone from TX is suing a NJ corporation in federal court in TX. The NJ corporation then moves to implead another NJ corporation. If the impleader is permitted, will the court lose its authority to adjudicate the case?

The answer is pretty clearly no, right? First off, if it's an impleader, so it's not an Owen v. Kroger situation, and even if it was, complete diversity would still be preserved. The thing is, the suggested time period given for answering the question is way longer than seems like is required, so I feel like I'm analyzing it wrong.

[Swimp]

So here's a hypo from an old exam that I don't think is difficult, but I feel like I'm missing something obvious.

Someone from TX is suing a NJ corporation in federal court in TX. The NJ corporation then moves to implead another NJ corporation. If the impleader is permitted, will the court lose its authority to adjudicate the case?

The answer is pretty clearly no, right? First off, if it's an impleader, so it's not an Owen v. Kroger situation, and even if it was, complete diversity would still be preserved. The thing is, the suggested time period given for answering the question is way longer than seems like is required, so I feel like I'm analyzing it wrong.

I think you're right that the court can still hear the case. Maybe the wrinkle you're supposed to talk about is the fact that the original D becomes a "3rd party P" for the purposes of the impleader, and the "third party D" isn't diverse.

[cynthia rose]

I'm starting to question whether my above answer to AllDangle is correct at all, or if it would be permissible to 'tag' the defendant in NC while he's at the courthouse for the first claim. That seems awfully unfair, and I could have sworn I remember my professor saying something about being in court not qualifying a person for general jurisdiction, but I don't know if that extended to the 'tag, you're it' rule as well and can't find it in my outline or notes. Ugh, all that typing only to tell you that you may not want to waste your time on it.

If someone is going to court to contest personal jurisdiction they can make a "special appearance" and can't be tagged while they're at the courthouse. Maybe that's what you're thinking about?

General jurisdiction is basically only where you're domiciled.. pj for other issues is proper if you're tagged or satisfy minimum contacts/reaching out for the topic of the suit.

Hope that helps a little, we only talked about things generally, we didn't talk about joinder andstuff

I looked through my notes again and you're right, I am thinking of the special appearances rule. Unfortunately we were only given that in the context of a new trial (I was looking in my joinder section earlier). We didn't touch on how it would affect a joinder issue. I'm still thinking my first instinct was the correct one...problem is, we discussed joinder just enough that I should be familiar with it, but little enough that I don't quite know what parts of it I should be familiar with She would go off on tangents for ten or fifteen minutes only to tell us half the time "this isn't on the exam." All of that not-on-the-exam stuff is starting to run together now. I sent her an email though so hopefully she will tell me that we don't have to worry about it.

[cynthia rose]

So here's a hypo from an old exam that I don't think is difficult, but I feel like I'm missing something obvious.

Someone from TX is suing a NJ corporation in federal court in TX. The NJ corporation then moves to implead another NJ corporation. If the impleader is permitted, will the court lose its authority to adjudicate the case?

The answer is pretty clearly no, right? First off, if it's an impleader, so it's not an Owen v. Kroger situation, and even if it was, complete diversity would still be preserved. The thing is, the suggested time period given for answering the question is way longer than seems like is required, so I feel like I'm analyzing it wrong.

What Swimp said. Maybe you're supposed to discuss the fact that if the original suit is settled before the impleader is, the TX court may decide not to keep the impleader? (e.g. some Asahi comparison) That's the only other thing I could see talking about there, and even then I think whether or not you talk about it depends on how much your professor likes or hates small tangents like that.

[sinfiery]

Hey, so how exactly does the test in Asahi coincide with the test in Volkswagon?

In VW, you have to have needed to know you could be sued in a state (which is weird because if you know a product can end up in the state, you know it can malfunction there..) so they instead used a directed activity test (is this purposeful availment?) so that the product would not serve as an implied agent for the seller no matter where it went

Under Asahi, the plurality would likely resemble closely with that decision. You can't just forsee the car being driven to OK, you need to have purposefully availed yourself to the specific market.
Whereas the Bernnan dissent would likely overrule VW?

Or would the important distinction be different because one is speaking towards where a product can be taken versus the other where it can be potentially sold?

I'm not sure how to put the two together


Upon further thought I think Asahi O'Conner standard comes from the WV idea but is only applied to stream of commerce cases and WV is applied to non-stream of commerce cases

Am I missing something?

[cynthia rose]

Hey, so how exactly does the test in Asahi coincide with the test in Volkswagon?

In VW, you have to have needed to know you could be sued in a state (which is weird because if you know a product can end up in the state, you know it can malfunction there..) so they instead used a directed activity test (is this purposeful availment?) so that the product would not serve as an implied agent for the seller no matter where it went

Under Asahi, the plurality would likely resemble closely with that decision. You can't just forsee the car being driven to OK, you need to have purposefully availed yourself to the specific market.
Whereas the Bernnan dissent would likely overrule VW?

Or would the important distinction be different because one is speaking towards where a product can be taken versus the other where it can be potentially sold?

I'm not sure how to put the two together


Upon further thought I think Asahi O'Conner standard comes from the WV idea but is only applied to stream of commerce cases and WV is applied to non-stream of commerce cases

Am I missing something?

I am confused as to what you're asking. Not sure if that is because I'm so tired or because of the way you worded the question.

Directed activity = purposeful availment, yes. You are also right that VW's majority ruling is the base for the reasoning given in Asahi, and that the major difference is that VW was talking about an isolated incident (one car that happened to find itself in OK), while Asahi is talking about stream of commerce (a product repeatedly finding its way to CA, albeit indirectly).

Brennan wrote one of the dissents in WWVW, so yeah, he would have absolutely overruled that outcome if he could have. That dissent was very consistent with his partial dissent in Asahi; he believed that foreseeability was enough for purposeful availment. His POV on this was even stronger in Asahi because that wasn't a one-time incident, but a regular occurrence, so the 'mere' foreseeability became not only predictable, but even expected. The Asahi defendant knew the buyer was using its valve assembly to build motorcycle tubes, and that it regularly marketed those tubes to people in CA. Under Brennan's reasoning, if the def. didn't want to purposefully avail itself to CA law it shouldn't have sold valves to a company that it knew got a decent amount of its sales from there.

And Brennan even made it a point in his Asahi dissent to note how the majority there was contradicting the majority opinion from WWVW (b/c the WWVW majority was all 'there's a difference between goods reaching a state through the chain of distribution, and one consumer taking the goods there' but then in Asahi they were suddenly like 'eh, you know what, we guess chain of distribution is not that different after all, it's not enough').

"Or would the important distinction be different because one is speaking towards where a product can be taken versus the other where it can be potentially sold?"

This isn't quite the distinction Brennan was trying to point out, I don't think. He was just noting the difference between a a consumer taking the product to the forum state and the stream of commerce causing the product to end up in the forum state. The majority in Asahi didn't see a notable difference at all; they believed that the product was only being "taken" to the forum state via the direct consumer.

[sinfiery]

It was definitely my wording but that was exactly the question I had in mind and you answered it great. Thanks a lot!

[Br3v]

thanks for the PER help guys, and Huell yes that sounds similar to what I have been taught so if you have interpretation advice feel free to share! I think most of my confusion comes from figuring out when PER stops and interpretation begins.

[Br3v]

I thought about this also, but since the NC case is specific PJ case the court only had PJ over him for that claim. Even though PJ is over parties, it is possible that it is only valid over that party for that specific claim. Obviously it wouldn't be hard to serve him in NC for the Alabama accident since he will already be in the state defending the other suit.

So I think my original answer is right. Once you have PJ over a party that is that. You don't have to check if the additional claim has good PJ because there is no such thing.

What you may be wanting to argue is that there is only specific jurisdiction over the party arising out of the original claim, as compared to general jurisdiction which would allow for PJ over any claim in that state. BUT once you have PJ over a party, regardless of SJ or GJ, then all you have to do is see if Rule 18 lets you add (yes) and if you have supplemental or independent SMJ.

[AllDangle]

I thought about this also, but since the NC case is specific PJ case the court only had PJ over him for that claim. Even though PJ is over parties, it is possible that it is only valid over that party for that specific claim. Obviously it wouldn't be hard to serve him in NC for the Alabama accident since he will already be in the state defending the other suit.

So I think my original answer is right. Once you have PJ over a party that is that. You don't have to check if the additional claim has good PJ because there is no such thing.

What you may be wanting to argue is that there is only specific jurisdiction over the party arising out of the original claim, as compared to general jurisdiction which would allow for PJ over any claim in that state. BUT once you have PJ over a party, regardless of SJ or GJ, then all you have to do is see if Rule 18 lets you add (yes) and if you have supplemental or independent SMJ.

I'm going to try and clear it up Monday. I know 18 says you can join any claims, even unrelated, but it still seems weird the court could adjudicate that joined claim if they wouldn't have the power to if it had been filed solo. It definitely makes sense from an efficiency standpoint, but goes against every rationale for PJ. Supplemental jurisdiction may cover it, but then again I'm not sure if you need personal jurisdiction in order for supplemental to kick in, since supplemental only extends to subject matter. I can't find info on this anywhere. I saw one law review article calling it "pendent personal jurisdiction" but couldn't view the whole article. As someone said earlier, it seems like you could file a 12(b)(2) and how could the court deny it? They don't have PJ over you for that claim, and supplemental would only cover the subject matter.

[lhanvt13]

I thought about this also, but since the NC case is specific PJ case the court only had PJ over him for that claim. Even though PJ is over parties, it is possible that it is only valid over that party for that specific claim. Obviously it wouldn't be hard to serve him in NC for the Alabama accident since he will already be in the state defending the other suit.

So I think my original answer is right. Once you have PJ over a party that is that. You don't have to check if the additional claim has good PJ because there is no such thing.

What you may be wanting to argue is that there is only specific jurisdiction over the party arising out of the original claim, as compared to general jurisdiction which would allow for PJ over any claim in that state. BUT once you have PJ over a party, regardless of SJ or GJ, then all you have to do is see if Rule 18 lets you add (yes) and if you have supplemental or independent SMJ.

I'm going to try and clear it up Monday. I know 18 says you can join any claims, even unrelated, but it still seems weird the court could adjudicate that joined claim if they wouldn't have the power to if it had been filed solo. It definitely makes sense from an efficiency standpoint, but goes against every rationale for PJ. Supplemental jurisdiction may cover it, but then again I'm not sure if you need personal jurisdiction in order for supplemental to kick in, since supplemental only extends to subject matter. I can't find info on this anywhere. I saw one law review article calling it "pendent personal jurisdiction" but couldn't view the whole article. As someone said earlier, it seems like you could file a 12(b)(2) and how could the court deny it? They don't have PJ over you for that claim, and supplemental would only cover the subject matter.

isn't PJ justto see if the court has jurisdiction over D? claim doesn't matter for PJ

[shifty_eyed]

I thought about this also, but since the NC case is specific PJ case the court only had PJ over him for that claim. Even though PJ is over parties, it is possible that it is only valid over that party for that specific claim. Obviously it wouldn't be hard to serve him in NC for the Alabama accident since he will already be in the state defending the other suit.

So I think my original answer is right. Once you have PJ over a party that is that. You don't have to check if the additional claim has good PJ because there is no such thing.

What you may be wanting to argue is that there is only specific jurisdiction over the party arising out of the original claim, as compared to general jurisdiction which would allow for PJ over any claim in that state. BUT once you have PJ over a party, regardless of SJ or GJ, then all you have to do is see if Rule 18 lets you add (yes) and if you have supplemental or independent SMJ.

I'm going to try and clear it up Monday. I know 18 says you can join any claims, even unrelated, but it still seems weird the court could adjudicate that joined claim if they wouldn't have the power to if it had been filed solo. It definitely makes sense from an efficiency standpoint, but goes against every rationale for PJ. Supplemental jurisdiction may cover it, but then again I'm not sure if you need personal jurisdiction in order for supplemental to kick in, since supplemental only extends to subject matter. I can't find info on this anywhere. I saw one law review article calling it "pendent personal jurisdiction" but couldn't view the whole article. As someone said earlier, it seems like you could file a 12(b)(2) and how could the court deny it? They don't have PJ over you for that claim, and supplemental would only cover the subject matter.

isn't PJ justto see if the court has jurisdiction over D? claim doesn't matter for PJ

The claim matters when the personal jurisdiction is specific not general. LIke if you live in Missouri and go to Arkansas to sell a boat, you can be sued there for claims arising from the transaction (like boat being defective). But you couldn't be sued in Arkansas because of a car accident that happened in Missouri just because you sold a boat in Arkansas once.

The question is whether the court has to have personal jurisdiction over you for all claims, including permissive and unrelated counterclaims, or if personal jurisdiction over one claim is enough. I am confused about this. The E&E only discusses subject matter jurisdiction when discussing supplemental jurisdiction. Maybe PJ is irrelevant, but like AllDangle says, it seems strange that the court can adjudicate a claim that it wouldn't have the power to if it was the only claim.

[FKASunny]

it seems strange that the court can adjudicate a claim that it wouldn't have the power to if it was the only claim.

Isn't this the whole point of supplemental jurisdiction?

And I haven't really started studying hard core for civ pro, but IIRC our professor said that pendent personal jurisdiction hasn't been settled yet by SCOTUS, but that the circuits seem to agree that when it has specific personal jurisdiction, the court can hear additional claims as long as they arise from the same nucleus of operative fact. If the court has SPJ and the additional claims aren't relevant, then the court can't hear them. However, I'm not 100% on this, and it's definitely an area I'm going to hit again once I'm done with my first exam.

[lhanvt13]

isn't PJ justto see if the court has jurisdiction over D? claim doesn't matter for PJ

The claim matters when the personal jurisdiction is specific not general. LIke if you live in Missouri and go to Arkansas to sell a boat, you can be sued there for claims arising from the transaction (like boat being defective). But you couldn't be sued in Arkansas because of a car accident that happened in Missouri just because you sold a boat in Arkansas once.

The question is whether the court has to have personal jurisdiction over you for all claims, including permissive and unrelated counterclaims, or if personal jurisdiction over one claim is enough. I am confused about this. The E&E only discusses subject matter jurisdiction when discussing supplemental jurisdiction. Maybe PJ is irrelevant, but like AllDangle says, it seems strange that the court can adjudicate a claim that it wouldn't have the power to if it was the only claim.

I've learned that personal jurisdiction over D should only matter when D is initially brought into court and permissive counterclaims and whatnot don't need more PJ analyses. PJ over the person should be enough and then the question would be SMJ for each claim

[shifty_eyed]

it seems strange that the court can adjudicate a claim that it wouldn't have the power to if it was the only claim.

Isn't this the whole point of supplemental jurisdiction?

And I haven't really started studying hard core for civ pro, but IIRC our professor said that pendent personal jurisdiction hasn't been settled yet by SCOTUS, but that the circuits seem to agree that when it has specific personal jurisdiction, the court can hear additional claims as long as they arise from the same nucleus of operative fact. If the court has SPJ and the additional claims aren't relevant, then the court can't hear them. However, I'm not 100% on this, and it's definitely an area I'm going to hit again once I'm done with my first exam.

Supplemental jurisdiction only comes into play when the other claims arise out of the same nucleus of facts, so I think the bolded part answers my question about non-relevant claims, but I'm not sure if my casebook/class has covered this.

[FKASunny]

it seems strange that the court can adjudicate a claim that it wouldn't have the power to if it was the only claim.

Isn't this the whole point of supplemental jurisdiction?

And I haven't really started studying hard core for civ pro, but IIRC our professor said that pendent personal jurisdiction hasn't been settled yet by SCOTUS, but that the circuits seem to agree that when it has specific personal jurisdiction, the court can hear additional claims as long as they arise from the same nucleus of operative fact. If the court has SPJ and the additional claims aren't relevant, then the court can't hear them. However, I'm not 100% on this, and it's definitely an area I'm going to hit again once I'm done with my first exam.

Supplemental jurisdiction only comes into play when the other claims arise out of the same nucleus of facts, so I think the bolded part answers my question about non-relevant claims, but I'm not sure if my casebook/class has covered this.

I left my notes and stuff in my locker on campus so I'm forced to only study for contracts, but what I was able to lift off of Westlaw, it seems like it's consensus that the claims must arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact, but that this is just Federal common law and that there is no explicit authorization for this. Like I said, I recall that my professor made an off-hand comment about it being an unsettled area, but we didn't delve into it too deeply. I doubt that, unless your professor specifically taught this wrinkle, you should worry too much about it.

[dj_roomba]

For the Hanna test, does a Federal Rule ever displace state substantive law? Or is the Hanna test only if there is conflicting state procedural law v. Federal law?

[FKASunny]

For the Hanna test, does a Federal Rule ever displace state substantive law? Or is the Hanna test only if there is conflicting state procedural law v. Federal law?

Can you come up with a hypo to get at what you mean?

[dj_roomba]

For the Hanna test, does a Federal Rule ever displace state substantive law? Or is the Hanna test only if there is conflicting state procedural law v. Federal law?

Can you come up with a hypo to get at what you mean?

Sorry I think I'm just confused about the entire Erie test. I'll just elaborate my question

1. Stupid question: What does " federal rule on point?" actually mean?
2. Anytime there is a Federal Rule in conflict with a state law (regardless of substantive v. procedural) you use the Hanna test to determine if it's valid. If the state law is purely substantive, it won't pass the Hanna test since it modifies or abridges state substantive rights. However, what if it's a state "substantive" law (the state calls it substantive) but it has procedural effects? I guess my real question is then, what exactly does " modifies or abridges state substantive right" mean? If a state substantive law with procedural effects is voided by the Federal Rule, does it count as modifying a state substantive right (even though it's substantive by name only)?

[FKASunny]

For the Hanna test, does a Federal Rule ever displace state substantive law? Or is the Hanna test only if there is conflicting state procedural law v. Federal law?

Can you come up with a hypo to get at what you mean?

Sorry I think I'm just confused about the entire Erie test. I'll just elaborate my question

1. Stupid question: What does " federal rule on point?" actually mean?
2. Anytime there is a Federal Rule in conflict with a state law (regardless of substantive v. procedural) you use the Hanna test to determine if it's valid. If the state law is purely substantive, it won't pass the Hanna test since it modifies or abridges state substantive rights. However, what if it's a state "substantive" law (the state calls it substantive) but it has procedural effects? I guess my real question is then, what exactly does " modifies or abridges state substantive right" mean? If a state substantive law with procedural effects is voided by the Federal Rule, does it count as modifying a state substantive right (even though it's substantive by name only)?

I'll preface this with the usual "I'm also just a dumb 1L" warning, and hopefully someone smarter than I am will chime in with a more comprehensive and clear answer.

1) I guess you could describe a federal rule as being on point when it clearly discusses and prescribes action relating to whatever's in controversy. So, in the FRCP 3 cases about statute of limitations, the court finds that FRCP only defines when an action is started, but doesn't discuss when the statute of limitations is actually tolled. The tolling of the SoL at the beginning of an action is federal common law, not procedural law authorized under the REA.

2) Every professor is going to teach this differently, and you should ALWAYS go with how your professor taught it in class, but the impression I walked away with was that you apply Hanna first, then Erie, and in most cases, the FRCP always govern (unless the rule isn't ACTUALLY on point.) Are you asking whether a state could just decide that certain procedural rules are substantive in name only as a way to circumvent this whole process? I doubt it. If there's a FRCP on point, then they're going to most likely find it to be procedural and apply the federal rule.

[Lavitz]

I like ლ(ಠ益ಠლ)'s explanation, but I already typed this so I'll add on.

Sorry I think I'm just confused about the entire Erie test. I'll just elaborate my question

1. Stupid question: What does " federal rule on point?" actually mean?

Take the federal rule and whatever state law you would be applying instead. Can they coexist? Then it's not exactly on point. Do they inevitably clash? Then it's on point.

2. Anytime there is a Federal Rule in conflict with a state law (regardless of substantive v. procedural) you use the Hanna test to determine if it's valid. If the state law is purely substantive, it won't pass the Hanna test since it modifies or abridges state substantive rights. However, what if it's a state "substantive" law (the state calls it substantive) but it has procedural effects? I guess my real question is then, what exactly does " modifies or abridges state substantive right" mean? If a state substantive law with procedural effects is voided by the Federal Rule, does it count as modifying a state substantive right (even though it's substantive by name only)?

If there's a state law that's purely substantive, then there really shouldn't be a federal rule clashing with that. But if there is, as in you mean if there's a federal rule that is on point and conflicts directly with a state substantive law, then right, that federal rule won't pass the Hanna/Sibbach test because it exceeds the authority granted to the Court in the Rules Enabling Act which allows the Court to create rules governing the realm of procedure.

If there's a state substantive law that has procedural effects, you're dealing with a mixed law, and you'd first look to see if there was a federal rule on point. If there is, then it just has to not exceed the authority of the REA or be unconstitutional. It will exceed the REA if it modifies substantive rights. What "modifies or abridges state substantive rights" is the million-dollar question. But the Court has taken a liberal view of it, holding in Hanna that the Court has the power to make any rules regulating "matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." It's a pretty easy test to pass and I don't think the Court has ever struck down a rule for that reason.

If there's no federal rule on point, but the state procedure conflicts with a federal procedural practice, apply the twin aims test.

If the state law is purely substantive, apply the state law.

[BPLawl]

I like ლ(ಠ益ಠლ)'s explanation, but I already typed this so I'll add on.

Sorry I think I'm just confused about the entire Erie test. I'll just elaborate my question

1. Stupid question: What does " federal rule on point?" actually mean?

Take the federal rule and whatever state law you would be applying instead. Can they coexist? Then it's not exactly on point. Do they inevitably clash? Then it's on point.

To add to what Lavitz just said, I think the discussion of Gasperini earlier ITT is instructive. Gasperini's an example where what 'on point' meant (i.e. does Rule 59 prohibit a state's broad standard of review?) was actually unclear or at issue. The dissent said the FRCP was on point and it was just a Rule 59 case; the majority said it wasn't and then Byrd balancing. What 'on point' means is an issue that can cut both ways.

[moonman157]

For ancillary jurisdiction: If A (California) files suit in federal court against B (NY), and then B impleads C (CA), and the claim was originally filed in federal court because of diversity of citizenship, can the federal court no longer hear the case? Am I making any sense at all?