Consider the following proposed amendment to the United States Constitution:
For claims arising out of torts (including products liability), a defendant may, without its consent, be subject to personal jurisdiction in the following States and in no others:
1. The State in which the defendant is domiciled. A corporation shall be deemed to be domiciled only in the State in which it has its corporate headquarters.
2. The State in which the defendant’s act or the defendant’s omission giving rise to the harm occurred.
3. The State in which the harm occurred, unless the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that its conduct might have effects in that State.
Explain how the proposed amendment would change current law.
[question goes on to say espouse policy shit (for/against changing), so do that if you want, but really the beginning part is nice for ironing out PJ]
I'm struggling tremendously with this so below is my answer to show that I've attempted it, but is certainly not a good answer
- The most noticeable thing is that it eliminates the possibility for general jurisdiction in the place that they're incorporated. It also eliminates general jurisdiction for "essentially at home" or the prior/weaker language of "systematic contacts". In terms of policy, who really cares? Noone's gonna sue these fucks in DE . I guess eliminating a potential forum may be bad.
- Similarly, I think it fucks with the "principal place of business" = citizenship for corporations, but I'm not sure if that's more of a SMJ issue in terms of spotting diversity?
- It affects "minimum contacts" analysis. If it occurs there, you can be subject for it... although again, this doesn't proscribe a court from saying that it would be unfair. Saying, "unforeseeable" seems to merely be the first suggested defense. [I really wish this hypo just said, "is subject" ]
- Same thought, somewhat cleans up stream of commerce debate for specific pj in the sense that merely being "reasonably foreseeable" = allowed, but I suppose fairness factors still may be at play considering the amendment merely says, "may be subject." (i.e. I'm not sure if Asahi can go fuck itself or not)
- Eliminates "presence" in the forum, Pennoyer jank, although that's arguably gone already...
- Expands possibility of tort forum being placed in originating state rather than the "directed at" state, although still permits the latter.
- Pretty sure nothing else in terms of distinguishing in personam from in rem/qir, especially because this is only a torts amendment
I feel like I'm confusing shit and definitely missing shit. Also, this is an exam question my professor emailed out without answers, so I don't know if it's against any policy to post it, but I doubt it.