^ Here's, e.g., what I did for Civ Pro for the section "Preparing a Complaint"
**IQBAL TEST** — only look at P's pleading
- RULE 1, SCOPE = FRCP should be construed in a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
- RULE 3, COMMENCING AN ACTION = by filing a complaint w/ the court
- RULE 7, PLEADINGS ALLOWED = (1) complaint, (2) answer to complaint, (3) answer to counterclaim, (4) answer to crossclaim, (5) 3d party complaint, (6) answer to 3d party complaint, (7) reply to an answer
- RULE 8, GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS = P must present a "short and plain statement" of the claim for relief
- RULE 9(b), PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS = When stating fraud/mistake, party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud/mistake
1. Complaint must go beyond threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.
2. Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Plausibility is context-specific and requires common sense.
Swanson v. Citibank (2010): displays the two alternative readings of Twiqbal
- Tries to reconcile Rule 8 with Iqbal — P must give enough details about subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together. . . unnecessary to stack up inferences side-by-side to see if P's are more compelling than opposing inferences.
- Posner applies the test more like the Iqbal court (by stacking up inferences in a probabilistic manner)
Conley v. Gibson (1957). OLD standard for Rule 8
- FRCP 8 doesn't require P to specify detailed facts — party must simply put D on notice [of what the case is about and the grounds upon which it rests] . . . an intentionally liberal approach (occurs b4 discovery)
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007): REJECTED Conley's "no set of facts" language. Imposed a plausibility requirement at the pleading stage.
- Formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action are insufficient . . . Facts must be taken as true
- P's complaint should be dismissed. Plausible that the telecom companies didn't agree to conspire, but rather continued to work in the areas that they had before (conscious parallelism)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009): Applied Twombly to CIVIL ACTIONS
- P must show that petitioners implemented the policy intentionally to discriminate. Complaint did not move the claim from conceivable to plausible — it's just as likely that the gov sought to keep suspected terrorists in secure conditions until suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity ("obvious alternative")
- Dissent: argues that the conclusions (together) are sufficient. Petitioners conceded that they could be liable for the acts of their subordinates.